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“What a troublesome thing a wall is! I thought it was to defend me, 
and not I it!”  
   -- Henry David Thoreau3 
Abstract 
The goal of the current U.S. Export Control Reform Initiative is to 
create a single control list, a single licensing agency, a unified 
information technology system, and a single primary enforcement 
coordination agency, and to move criminal law enforcement 
functions currently in the Commerce Department’s Office of Export 
Enforcement (OEE) to the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).  The plan to create a single control list, a single licensing 
agency, a single IT system, and a single enforcement coordination 
center has received support from exporters, but the movement of 
agents from OEE to DHS has raised concerns and objections.  Is the 
proposed combination of enforcement agencies necessary, and in the 
best interests of national security and foreign policy?  The authors 
believe that specialized export law enforcement officers of the type 
currently assigned to the Commerce Department’s OEE should be 
located within the single export licensing agency, and that the 
agency should include the more compliance-focused review practices 
currently used by the State Department.  Until a single licensing 
agency is created by Congress, however, it is best to continue the 
current compliance and enforcement practices of both the 
Commerce and State Departments.  
I. Introduction 
In August 2009, President Obama raised the hopes of U.S. manufacturers of 
defense articles and of their foreign customers when he called for reforms of U.S. 
export control regulations.  This effort would relax controls on exports of many 
articles that have both military and civilian uses, and present a lower risk to 
national security interests and foreign policy objectives.4  In his 2011 State of the 
Union address, President Obama also addressed export control enforcement 
challenges, noting that “there are twelve different agencies that deal with exports.”5 
Depending on how one defines “agencies” and “deal with exports,” there are even 
more.6   
 
3. HENRY D. THOREAU, A YANKEE IN CANADA, WITH ANTI-SLAVERY AND REFORM PAPERS 74 (1866). 
4. Press Release, Notice Regarding the Export Administration Act, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE 
PRESS SEC’Y (Aug. 13, 2009), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/notice-regarding-export-
administration-act. 
5. See Press Release, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Jan. 25, 2011), http://1.usa.gov/1bvegnK.   
6. See JOHN R. LIEBMAN, ROSZEL C. THOMSEN II, & JAMES E. BARTLETT III, UNITED STATES 
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Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates followed in April 2010, by announcing the 
Export Control Reform Initiative (ECR),7 a plan that would simplify U.S. export 
control regulations by merging defense articles on the State Department’s U.S. 
Munitions List (USML)8 with dual-use articles on the Commerce Department’s 
Commerce Control List (CCL),9 by creating a single licensing agency, and by 
creating a single enforcement coordination agency to combine the forces of existing 
myriad law enforcement agencies.10  The Administration also proposed as part of 
ECR to merge the Department of Commerce’s criminal investigative functions 
within the Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) into the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency, 11  thus 
separating the enforcement agents from the licensing specialists.12  
Secretary Gates criticized the current definitions of articles subject to export 
classification and control as overly broad, which he said makes it more difficult to 
enforce export controls on items and technologies that truly need to stay in this 
country. “Frederick the Great’s famous maxim that ‘he who defends everything 
defends nothing’ certainly applies to export control,” Gates said, adding that ECR 
would result in increased controls on fewer items, or “[i]n short, a system where 
higher walls are placed around fewer, more critical items,”13 thus echoing the 
 
EXPORT CONTROLS § 1.03 (7th ed. 2014) (U.S. Federal agencies with control over exports include 
the Dep’t of Agric., Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Agric. Marketing Serv., and 
Foreign Agric. Serv.; Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Indus. & Sec. and Bureau of Census; Dep’t 
of Energy, Office of Imports and Exports; Dep’t of Defense, Defense Tech. Sec. Agency; Dep’t of 
State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls; Dep’t of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets 
Control; Agency for Int’l Dev.; Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, Overseas Private Inv. Corp., U.S. 
Int’l Trade Admin.; Export-Import Bank of the U.S.; Small Bus. Admin.; U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Admin.; and U.S. Trade Rep.); See Export.gov’s Partner Agencies, EXPORT.GOV (June 27, 2012, 
6:58 AM), http://1.usa.gov/1xaVBu2. 
7. See Press Release, President Obama Lays the Foundation for a New Export Control System To 
Strengthen National Security and the Competitiveness of Key U.S. Manufacturing and Technology 
Sectors, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Aug. 30, 2010), http://1.usa.gov/14uULyw.   
8. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2015). 
9. 15 C.F.R. § 774 (Supp. I 2012). 
10. Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec’y of Defense, Remarks Before the Business Executives for Nat’l Sec. on 
Export Control Reform (Apr. 20, 2010), http://archive.defense.gov/Speeches/ 
Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1453.  
11. BUSINESS USA, EXPORT CONTROL REFORM INITIATIVE FACT SHEET #6: EXPORT CONTROL 
ENFORCEMENT (2012), available at https://business.usa.gov/export-portal?static/ECR%20Factsheet 
%206%20-%20Enforcement_Latest_eg_main_047477.pdf. 
12. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PROPOSED REFORMS CREATE OPPORTUNITIES TO ADDRESS 
ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES 30 (2012) [hereinafter PROPOSED REFORMS CREATE OPPORTUNITIES] 
(discussing the “potential challenge with planned reform efforts [that] include[] the potential for 
separating criminal and administration enforcement functions currently administered by OEE” 
and noting that although the effort would require legislation, “it could result in the transfer of OEE 
enforcement personnel to ICE and the administrative enforcement functions to a single licensing 
agency”). 
13. Id. 
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remark by former national security advisor McGeorge Bundy in Congressional 
testimony, “If we guard our toothbrushes and diamonds with equal zeal, we will lose 
fewer toothbrushes and more diamonds.”14    
Although creating a single list and single licensing agency, and merging OEE into 
DHS will require Congressional action, which may be unlikely,15 significant portions 
of ECR have been implemented, including the transition of less significant items 
from the more tightly controlled USML to the CCL.16  Some have criticized the 
transition of certain items from the USML to the CCL as “deregulation,”17 but the 
reforms have been generally well received by American industry and its foreign 
customers, who had long complained that the current system was unnecessarily 
burdensome.18   
 
14. Adam Yarmolinsky, Shades of McCarthyism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1989, available at 
http://nyti.ms/1vEfaIu (quoting McGeorge Bundy’s Congressional testimony). 
15. CECIL HUNT & THOMAS M. DEBUTTS, OVERVIEW OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2 (Practicing Law 
Institute Program, Coping with U.S. Export Controls 2009) (“Competing committee jurisdictions, 
divergent policy objectives, and limited leadership interest, make it unlikely that Congress will 
produce the ‘one law, one agency’ system that most countries enjoy.”). 
16. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL REFORM INITIATIVE FACT SHEET #1: THE BASICS 
(2013), available at http://1.usa.gov/1iU8oy7 (“The control list-related reforms will move less 
sensitive items, mostly parts and components, from the State munitions list to the Commerce list.”). 
17. See, e.g., The Export Administration Act: A Review of Outstanding Policy Considerations: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade of the H. Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 22 (2009) (statement of Arthur Shulman, General Counsel, 
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control) (“The focus of export control reforms should be on 
ensuring that the system protects U.S. national security in the 21st century - not on removing 
the remaining speed bumps on the export superhighway.”); David R. Fitzgerald, Leaving the 
Back Door Open: How Export Control Reform’s Deregulation May Harm America’s Security, 15 
N.C.J.L. & TECH. 65, 89 (2014) (former Army Ranger and Afghanistan War veteran criticizing 
justifications advanced for Export Control Reform); Benjamin Goad, Export Control Overhaul 
Sparks National Security Scrap, THE HILL (Oct. 17, 2013, 12:47 AM), available at 
http://bit.ly/1CQenvT (“In my mind, it’s a major deregulation,” said Steven Pelak, a former 
national coordinator for export control enforcement at the Justice Department.  Pelak . . . said 
the effort would make it easier for nations like Iran and China ‘to obtain our spare parts.’”); 
Editorial, Shortsighted Arms Deregulation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2013, available at 
http://nyti.ms/1xeeA8D (“The White House has said that the old system strained resources by 
trying to protect all items on the control lists instead of focusing on the most militarily 
significant ones. It also said that the system disadvantaged American companies competing 
with foreign enterprises not subject to rigorous controls. Those are not strong arguments. The 
United States already dominates the international arms market, with nearly 80 percent of the 
sales, and the State Department denied a mere 1 percent of the arms export license requests 
from 2008 to 2010.”). 
18. See, e.g., Export Control Reform: The Agenda Ahead, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, 113th Cong. 4 (Apr. 24, 2013) (statement of Thomas Kelly, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Bureau 
of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State) (“But because our current export controls are 
confusing, time consuming, and many would say overreaching, our allies increasingly seek to design 
out U.S. parts and services thus avoiding our export controls, and use monitoring that comes with 
them, in favor of indigenous design.  This threatens the viability of our defense industrial base 
especially in these austere times.”); Export Controls: Are We Protecting Security and Facilitating 
Exports?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, & Trade of the H. Comm. 
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The movement of certain items on the USML to the CCL and the differing 
approaches to export control enforcement by the Departments of State and 
Commerce, however, results in a strange outcome; items that are most sensitive 
(remaining on the USML) continue to be controlled by the State Department, the 
agency with weaker enforcement authorities and an approach historically focused 
on compliance rather than on enforcement, whereas less sensitive items (on the 
CCL), including those that were once on the USML, are now administered by the 
agency with a dedicated group of law enforcement agents wielding sweeping 
administrative and criminal enforcement authority.19    
This inconsistency does not appear to have troubled the White House, as the 
Administration uses the presence of agents in the Department of Commerce as a 
way to defend against allegations that ECR is a de-regulation or de-control effort.  
One White House fact sheet, for example, posed the following “myths and facts”: 
Myth 3: This decontrol effort will result in U.S.-origin items being 
more widely available for use in human rights abuses.  
Fact:  ECR is a prioritization of controls and not a de-control effort. 
. . .  For items on the Commerce Control List, administrative and 
criminal export violations are also enforced by the Department of 
Commerce . . ., which has over 100 special agents dedicated 
exclusively to export control enforcement. . . .  As a result of the 
transition of less sensitive items from the U.S. Munitions List to the 
Commerce Control List, the U.S. Government has more export 
enforcement agents investigating possible violations of 
Commerce-administered controls.20 
 
on Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. (June 26, 2007) (statement of John Engler, President of the Nat’l 
Assoc. of Mfrs.) (“The current [export control] system is a relic of a different era when technology 
evolved more slowly, the United States dominated high-technology industries, and U.S. companies 
concentrated their manufacturing and R&D in U.S. facilities.”); Michael N. Gold, Conference on 
Space and Telecommunications Law: The Wrong Stuff: America’s Aerospace Export Control Crisis, 
87 NEB. L. REV. 521, 528 (2008) (“In short, if the objectives of the 1998 export control reforms 
expanding the ITAR were to cripple domestic U.S. capacity, lose billions of dollars, and bolster 
European competition, all without impacting Chinese capabilities, then we should rest assured that 
the mission has been accomplished.”); Howard L. Berman, Op-Ed., U.S. Export-Control Policy in 
Dire Need of an Update, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 15, 2010.  
19. LIEBMAN, THOMSEN, & BARTLETT, supra note 6, § 4.01[1][b] (“Defense manufacturers occasionally 
quip that the goal of the Department of Commerce is to help American export U.S. goods and 
services, but the goal of the Department of State is to stop them.  There is usually a grain of truth 
in hyperbole, and that grain is found in the difference between the effects of the . . . EAR (footnote 
omitted) and the . . . ITAR.  The EAR generally permits the export of dual-use goods and services 
without license unless specifically listed in the EAR, but the ITAR prohibits the export of all defense 
articles and services unless specifically permitted by the process described in the ITAR.”). 
20. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL REFORM INITIATIVE FACT SHEET #2: MYTHS AND FACTS 
2013) (emphasis in original), available at http://1.usa.gov/1GWZXOh. 
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Under ECR, therefore, part of the justification the Administration uses to support 
changes to the controls of items in Phase II would be negated by planned legislative 
changes in Phase III.21 
Another anomaly arises from Section 305 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, which the President signed into law.  
That section essentially authorizes OEE special agents to exercise their law 
enforcement powers when enforcing the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) 
during periods when the Export Administration Act (EAA) has lapsed and the EAR 
are in force pursuant to an Executive Order issued pursuant to International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).  Previously the OEE special agents’ 
enforcement powers were authorized only by the EAA and during periods of lapse 
the agents had received their enforcement powers by means of special deputation by 
the U.S. Marshals Service.  The implication of the grant of permanent police powers 
to OEE, in legislation enacted by the Congress and signed into law by President 
Obama, and the establishment of the Export Enforcement Coordination center, is 
that the Government remains committed to using the complementary strengths of 
multiple law enforcement agencies to police export control laws, rather than a single 
agency approach.   
This article provides an overview of export enforcement, explores how the 
statutory creation a single licensing agency affects enforcement, and discusses 
whether creating an export enforcement agency under the Department of Homeland 
Security, separated from the licensing agency, is achievable and desirable.  We 
conclude that if the State and Commerce licensing agencies are combined by 
Congress, the single licensing agency should include a law enforcement branch 
similar to OEE, and that the agency should combine the State Department’s 
compliance review process with the Commerce Department’s criminal investigation 
methods.  Absent those changes, continuing the current separate agency 
enforcement practices will better achieve U.S. national security and foreign policy 
objectives for export controls than would merging OEE into DHS. 
 
21. About Export Control Reform, EXPORT.GOV (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:00 PM), 
http://export.gov/ecr/eg_main_047329.asp (“The Administration is implementing the reform in 
three phases. Phases I and II reconcile various definitions, regulations, and policies for export 
controls, all the while building toward Phase III, which will create a single control list, single 
licensing agency, unified information technology system, and enforcement coordination center.”). 
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II. U.S. Export Controls Overview22  
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress authority to “regulate Commerce with 
foreign nations,”23 and numerous acts of Congress have given the President 
relatively continuous authority to regulate exports of weapons and war supplies, 
primarily for national defense, but also to preserve materials deemed to be in short 
supply.24  The first peacetime comprehensive export controls legislation for “dual 
use” articles – those with both civilian and military applications – was the 1949 
Export Control Act,25 which was conceived as a temporary measure, but was 
 
22. Several thorough summaries of U.S. export laws and regulations are available.  See generally JOHN 
R. LIEBMAN, ROSZEL C. THOMSEN II, & JAMES E. BARTLETT III, UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS 
(7th ed. 2014); ERIC L. HIRSCHHORN, THE EXPORT CONTROL AND EMBARGO HANDBOOK (3d ed. 
2010); Harold J. Berman & John R. Garson, United States Export Controls—Past, Present, and 
Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 67 (1967); Stephen M. Boyd & Linda A. Whisman, The U.S. Law of 
Export Controls: A Selected Bibliography, 18 INT’L LAW. 483–90 (1984); Bert Chapman, Export 
Controls: A Contemporary History, PURDUE UNIV. E-PUBS (Dec. 13, 2013), http://bit.ly/1vGcqfY; 
Christopher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export Controls on Technology 
Transfers in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 441 (2003); Homer E. Moyer, 
Jr. & Linda A. Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues, 
and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1 (1983). 
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   
24. In 1774, Congress outlawed the export of goods to Great Britain and its colonies, thus 
establishing the first statutory American export controls.  THE ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION, art. 
4, Oct. 20, 1774, available at, http://www.constitution.org/bcp/art_assoc.htm (“[W]e will not 
directly or indirectly, export any merchandise or commodity whatsoever to Great-Britain, 
Ireland, or the West-Indies, except rice to Europe.”).  Since then, the United States has imposed 
export controls for a variety of reasons. See, e.g., Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 
91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–13) (expired 1979); Arms 
Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1321 (1968) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 2751–99aa-2); Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021–32 (1964)) (repealed 1969); Neutrality Act of 1939, Pub. L. 
No. 54-2, ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4 (demonstrating there were three related neutrality statutes that, inter 
alia, prohibited arms sales to belligerents to maintain the neutrality of the United States); 
Neutrality Act of 1937, ch. 146, § 2(a), 50 Stat. 122; Tin Protection Act, ch. 74, 49 Stat. 1140 
(1936) (previously codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 86–88) (prohibiting unlicensed exports of tin plate 
scrap); Neutrality Act of 1935, ch. 837, 49 Stat. 1081 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 441 note); Trading 
with the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 95a–
95b and 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–44); Embargo Act, 2 Stat. 451 (1807) (prohibiting all exports from 
the United States on civilian vessels).  See generally Berman & Garson, supra note 22. But see 
U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX, § 1 (1778), available at http://1.usa.gov/1Bl2kST 
(prohibiting the United States from restraining the respective states “from prohibiting 
exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever”).     
25. Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949) (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. app. §§ 2021–31 (1964)), repealed by Arms Export Control Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 
1320 (1968) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–99). 
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successively renewed until 1969,26 when it was repealed27 and replaced by the 
Export Administration Act (EAA),28 in which Congress delegated to the executive 
branch its authority to control the exportation of dual-use goods and technologies.29     
In 1976, Congress enacted the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),30 giving the 
President the authority to control the import and export of defense articles and 
services, and other items listed by the President on the USML31 in the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),32 as administered by the Secretary of State33 
through the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC).34   
Violations of the ITAR and EAR may also be charged under or in association with 
other statutes, including U.S. customs laws35 and the Foreign Trade Regulations36 
 
26. Pub. L. No. 103-277, 108 Stat. 1407 (1994); Pub. L. No. 103-10, § 2, 107 Stat. 40 (1993); Pub. L. No. 
100-418, tit. II, § 2431, 102 Stat. 1362 (1988); Pub. L. No. 99-64, tit. I, § 120, 99 Stat. 155 (1985); 
Pub. L. No. 98-222, 98 Stat. 36 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-207, 97 Stat. 1391 (1983); Pub. L. No. 98-108, 
§ 1, 97 Stat. 744 (1983); Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 20, 93 Stat. 535 (1979). 
27. Pub. L. No. 91-105, § 1, 83 Stat. 169 (1969) (providing for termination of 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021–32 
on Dec. 31, 1969). 
28. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–20 (2006).  The EAA has lapsed, as happens periodically, because it is a 
temporary statute with a set expiration date.  See id. § 2419; Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 20, 93 Stat. 503, 
535 (1979).  See generally Wisc. Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 317 
F.3d 275, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing lapses of EAA and declarations of national emergencies 
to continue EAR); Electronic Frontier Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, No. C12–3683-TEH, 2013 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98625 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2013) (discussing lapses of EAA and declarations of 
national emergencies to maintain export controls). 
29. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (2015). 
30. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–99 (2015). 
31. Id. § 2778(a)(1) (The AECA gives the President authority, inter alia, to: “control the import and the 
export of defense articles and defense services and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons of 
the United States involved in the export and import of such articles and services. The President is 
authorized to designate those items which shall be considered as defense articles and defense 
services for the purposes of this section and to promulgate regulations for the import and export of 
such articles and services. The items so designated shall constitute the United States Munitions 
List.”); 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2015). 
32. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–130 (2015).  The ITAR was promulgated by the Secretary of State pursuant to 
Exec. Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (Jan. 18, 1977). 
33. The statutory authority of the President to promulgate regulations with respect to exports of 
defense articles and defense services, and the temporary import of defense articles, is delegated to 
the Secretary of State by Exec. Order No. 13,637, 3 C.F.R. § 223 (2013).  The ITAR implements that 
authority.   
34. By virtue of delegations of authority by the Secretary of State, the ITAR is administered by the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Defense Trade Controls, Bureau of Political-Military 
Affairs.  22 C.F.R. § 120.12; Key Personnel, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE 
CONTROL (Oct. 29, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1tp5XIW (a table of the organization of DDTC and contact 
information for key employees); See generally Overview of U.S. Export Control System, U.S. STATE 
DEP’T,  http://www.state.gov/strategictrade/overview (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). 
35. E.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 1592, 1641 (2012); 19 C.F.R. pts. 0-192 (2015). 
36. 15 C.F.R. pt. 30 (2015) (administered by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Census and 
enforced by its Office of Export Enforcement and the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs Border Protection). 
Defending the “Higher Walls” – The Effects of U.S. Export Control Reform on Export Enforcement 
9 
that require filing Electronic Export Information reports.37  Other statutes used to 
enforce export control violations include smuggling,38 money laundering,39 wire 
fraud,40 and false statements.41  The Justice Department42 has also prosecuted illicit 
international procurement networks using a conspiracy charge or conspiracy to 
defraud the United States charge often asserted under 18 U.S.C. § 371.43  This 
 
37. 15 C.F.R. § 30.71 (2014). 
38. 18 U.S.C. § 554 (2012) (“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly exports or sends from the United 
States, or attempts to export or send from the United States, any merchandise, article, or object 
contrary to any law or regulation of the United States, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any 
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise, article or object, 
prior to exportation, knowing the same to be intended for exportation contrary to any law or 
regulation of the United States, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, 
or both.”); see also United States v. Yang, 3:12-cr-00165-MMA (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012) (charging a 
Chinese national with smuggling goods from the United States relating to the unlawful export of 
accelerometers used in aircraft, missiles and other “smart” munitions and in measuring explosives); 
United States v. Hong Wei Xian, 1:10-cr-00207-GBL (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 2011) (sentencing defendant 
to 24 months in prison for conspiracy to violate AECA and smuggle goods unlawfully from the 
United States in connection with efforts to export to China radiation hardened microchips used in 
satellite systems). 
39. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 (2012).  These statutes were brought into existence by the Money Laundering 
Control Act of 1986, tit. I, § 1352(a), Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207–18, which has since been 
expanded.  In general, these statutes prohibit knowingly engaging in financial transactions using 
funds derived from a “specified unlawful activity” (SUA).  Each of the export control and sanctions 
statutes, such as the EAA and AECA, are referred to as a SUA. See, e.g., United States v. Modanlo, 
No. 10-cr-0295, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12683 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2014) (referencing six counts of money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956–57 against a defendant in connection with violations 
of IEEPA).  
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Chih-Kwang Hwa, No. 2:13-cr-00226-JLR (W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 14, 2013) (Precision Image Corporation owner, Chih-Kwang Hwa, pled guilty to wire 
fraud for violations arising from illegal exports under AECA). 
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Zhen Zhou Wu, 711 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(noting charges against defendants for falsifying “Shipper’s Export Declarations” in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)). 
42. The President appointed the first Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for the National Security 
Division in 2006 and among his first tasks, Ken Wainstein appointed the first ever National Export 
Control Coordinator. See Press Release, Justice Department Appoints National Export Control 
Coordinator as Part of Enhanced Counter-Proliferation Effort, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 20, 
2007), http://1.usa.gov/1ECv0gd (“The Justice Department has appointed Steven W. Pelak, an 18-
year veteran federal prosecutor, to serve as the Justice Department’s first-ever National Export 
Control Coordinator to improve the investigation and prosecution of illegal exports of U.S. arms 
and sensitive technology, Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, 
announced today.” In announcing the appointment of Steven W. Pelak to this position, AAG 
Wainstein called the threat posed to the United States by illegal exports of controlled technology 
“substantial” and noted a report by the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive that 
identified “108 nations . . . involved in collection efforts against sensitive U.S. technologies in fiscal 
year 2005.”). 
43. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (providing that “If two or more persons conspire either to commit any 
offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any 
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”); 
see also United States v. Monsieur, No. 1:09-cr-00186-WS-C (S.D. Ala. Oct. 1, 2010) (sentenced 
to twenty-three months in prison for conspiracy to illegally export F-5 fighter jet engines from 
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occurred, for example, in United States v. Larijani, where the U.S. charged an 
alleged illicit procurement network involving components for improvised explosive 
devices and certain export control violations, which led to the first extradition of 
Singaporean nationals on charges of export control violations.44 
A. Defense Articles Regulated Under the AECA and ITAR by 
 State/DDTC 
The ITAR prohibits45 the export46 and temporary import47 of defense articles48 
and technical data,49 the provision of defense services50 to foreign persons,51 and the 
brokering52 of defense articles or defense services by all persons53 in the United 
States54 and by U.S. persons55 wherever located, unless approved in advance56 by a 
DDTC-issued export license,57 agreement,58 or by qualifying for an ITAR 
 
the United States to Iran). See Pub. L. No. 110-96, 121 Stat. 1011 (2007) (on October 16, 2007, 
the President signed into law amendments to IEEPA that increased the civil and criminal 
penalties and also to include conspiracy as a basis for a violation). 
44. United States v. Larijani, No. 1:10-cr-00174 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2013) (extradited defendants sentenced 
for a “Klein conspiracy” in connection with illegally exporting goods to Iran); Press Release, Two 
Extradited from Singapore in Connection with Plot to Illegally Export Military Antennas, FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Dec. 21, 2012), http://1.usa.gov/1BuS8JV; see also United States v. 
Akhtar, No. 1:10-cr-00103-JFM (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2012) (sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison 
for pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit export violations and defraud the United States for 
sending nuclear related materials to Pakistan); INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 9.1.3.4.8.2 (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 371) (“A Klein conspiracy, which is named for the leading case of United States v. Klein, is 
a conspiracy to defraud the government by impeding and impairing the lawful functions of the IRS 
in computing, assessing and collecting Federal income taxes.”). See generally Press Release, 
Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and Embargo-
Related Criminal Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1xKW9KS. 
45. Although some writers refer to the ITAR and EAR with plural verbs (“the ITAR prohibit” or “were 
amended”), in this article we follow State Department usage of the singular verb.  See, e.g., 
Amendment to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations: Libya and UNSCR 2009, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 68,313 (Nov. 4, 2011) (“The ITAR is amended . . .”) (emphasis added). 
46. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (2013). 
47. Id. § 120.18.  The President delegated his authority under the AECA to regulate the permanent 
import of defense articles on the U.S. Munitions Import List, 27 C.F.R. § 447.21, to the Attorney 
General.  Exec. Order No. 13,284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4075 (Jan. 23, 2003).  The enforcement of controls 
on the permanent import of defense articles is outside the scope of this article. 
48. 22 C.F.R. § 120.6. 
49. Id. § 120.10. 
50. Id. § 120.9. 
51. Id. § 120.16. 
52. Id. § 129.1. 
53. Id. § 120.14. 
54. Id. § 120.13. 
55. Id. § 120.15. 
56. Id. § 123.1(a). 
57. Id. § 120.20; id. pt. 123. 
58. Id. §§ 120.21–.23; id. pt. 124. 
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exemption59 under the ITAR licensing requirements.  Any person in the United 
States who manufactures, exports, or temporarily imports defense articles, 
furnishes defense services to foreign persons, or brokers defense articles or services 
must register with DDTC60 and maintain records of regulated activities for 5 years.61  
Persons who pay certain fees or commissions to secure the sale of defense articles or 
services must report those payments to DDTC.62   
The AECA authorizes punishment of ITAR violations with fines, imprisonment, 
and debarment,63 and DDTC has authority to impose civil penalties up to $500,000 
without a criminal conviction.64  Criminal penalties for a violation of the ITAR may 
now result in up to 20 years’ imprisonment and $1,000,000 in fines.65  Exporters 
suspected of egregious violations often voluntarily consent to paying civil penalties 
and performing corrective actions to obtain a “consent agreement” with DDTC.66  
The consent agreement is initiated by DDTC preparing a draft charging letter and 
order listing the charged violations and proposed penalties and corrective actions, 
and upon receiving the consent of the accused party, DDTC forwards the charging 
letter, consent agreement, and order to the Assistant Secretary for Political-Military 
Affairs for approval.67  Cases that are settled in that manner may not be reopened 
or appealed,68 but failure of the charged party to comply with the terms of the 
consent agreement and order may result in a requirement to pay the civil penalty 
and comply with other punitive terms of the order.69 
 
59. Id. § 123.1(a). 
60. Id. §§ 122.1(a), 129.3. 
61. Id. §§ 122.5, 123.26. 
62. Id. pt. 130. 
63. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2012) (violations may result in fines not more than $1,000,000, imprisonment 
for not more than 20 years, or both); 22 C.F.R. § 127.3 (2015); id. § 127.7 (permitting Assistant Sec’y 
of State for Political-Military Affairs to administratively debar and thereby prohibit any person 
from activities subject to the ITAR).  
64. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778(e); 22 C.F.R. § 127.10(a). 
65. 22 U.S.C § 2778(c). 
66. 22 C.F.R. § 128.11(b) (2015); see also U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Intersil 
Corp., at 2 (June 16, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1xIxK8P; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, Raytheon Co., at 2 (Apr. 30, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/1ByQgOf; U.S. Dep’t of State, 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Xe Services, LLC, at 2 (Aug. 18, 2010), 
http://1.usa.gov/149npWw. 
67. 22 C.F.R. § 128.11(b). 
68. Id. 
69. Hughes Network Systems (Beijing) Co. Ltd. (HNS China), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hughes 
Network Systems Corporation (“HNS”), was under a Consent Agreement dated March 2003 with 
DDTC for their activities related to failed satellite launches in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  
Alleged violations of the Consent Agreement led to DDTC’s May 2004 imposition of a policy of denial 
against HNS for a period of one year and in January 2005, DDTC entered into a new Consent 
Agreement with HNS and its successor DirectTV Group, Inc. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Notice of 
Debarment Involving Hughes Network Systems (Beijing) Co. Ltd, 70 Fed. Reg. 35,333 (June 17, 
2005). 
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The ITAR authorizes ICE and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to “ensure 
observance” of the ITAR “as to the export of any defense article or technical data”70 
and to use “any other lawful means or authorities to investigate such a matter.”71  
CBP may also require exporters to produce other relevant documents and 
information relating to the export.72  The Department of Defense Security Service 
(DSS) is also authorized to take appropriate action when export of classified 
technical data or defense articles are involved and DSS may require production of 
documents and information relating to the proposed export.73 But the ITAR does not 
provide exclusive investigative authority over the ITAR to any single law 
enforcement agency and other law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, are 
frequently involved in investigations of ITAR violations.  Historically, DDTC has 
had at least one liaison agent both from ICE and the FBI to help coordinate licensing 
determinations relating to ongoing investigations and handle potential referrals 
from DDTC for further investigation by law enforcement.74  DDTC uses a standard 
form to submit referrals to law enforcement agencies containing the facts of 
suspected violations, but does not generally provide copies of voluntary disclosures 
to law enforcement agencies.75 
B. Dual-Use Items Regulated Under the EAA, IEEPA, and EAR by 
 Commerce/BIS 
Like the ITAR, the EAR prohibits exports of listed items unless authorized by an 
export license or qualifying for an exception76 to the licensing requirements.  The 
differences between the two separate lists, USML and CCL, are being reduced by 
the transfer of controls on some articles and technology from the USML to the CCL, 
 
70. 22 C.F.R. § 127.4(a) (2013).   
71. Id. § 127.4(d). Interview with Sue Gainor, Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Compliance, 
U.S. Department of State (Jan. 9, 2015) (the yearly number of DHS/ICE indictments under the 
AECA were as follows:  FY2007: 121; FY2008: 180; FY2009: 240; FY2010: 232; FY2011: 392; 
FY2012: 603; FY2013: unavailable; and FY2014: unavailable. The yearly number of DHS/ICE 
convictions under the AECA were as follows:  FY2007: 91; FY2008: 119; FY2009: 194; FY2010: 162; 
FY2011: 263; FY2012: 443; FY2013: unavailable; and FY2014: unavailable). 
72. 22 C.F.R. § 127.4(c). 
73. Id. § 125.3. 
74. Interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 71; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PROPOSED 
REFORMS CREATE OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 12, at 19–20; Glen E. Smith, Chief, Enforcement Div., 
Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, OFAC International Trade Symposium: Defense 
Trade Compliance 3 (May 15, 2009), http://1.usa.gov/14IYZmT; see also Interview with Sue Gainor, 
supra note 71 (the yearly number of DDTC referrals to ICE and/or the FBI were as follows:  FY2007: 
34; FY2008: 25; FY2009: 19; FY2010: 37; FY2011: 31; FY2012: 41; FY2013: 35; and FY2014: 22). 
75. Interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 71. 
76. 15 C.F.R. § 740.1(a) (2014).  While the EAR consistently uses the word “exception” from licensing 
requirements, the ITAR uses the equivalent word “exemption” in the same context.  See, e.g., 22 
C.F.R. § 120.20. 
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but the historical difference has been that the USML, as its name indicates, 
primarily contains munitions and military technology without significant civil uses, 
while the CCL controls dual-use items that have substantial civil use but may have 
military uses as well.  EAR controls on CCL items are generally less strict than ITAR 
controls on USML items requiring a license, exemption, or other authorization from 
DDTC, but items on the CCL do not require a license for export to most destinations 
unless specifically indicated in the EAR.  The EAA77 was the primary statutory 
authority for the EAR,78 which is administered by the Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).79  Like the expired Export Control Act, the 
EAA was also a temporary measure, and when enacted, was set to terminate under 
its “sunset clause” on September 30, 1983.80  On many occasions, Congress has 
reauthorized the EAA by simply postponing its expiration date,81 but it does not 
always do so before the Act’s termination.  As a result, there have been several 
periods of lapse, ranging in length from a few days to many years between the Act’s 
expiration and revival.82  The EAA expired most recently on August 20, 2001.83  
Since then, various bills have been introduced that would revive it,84 but none has 
been enacted.  However, the President has continued controlling the exports of dual-
use items by issuing annual notices of renewal of an Executive Order issued in 2001, 
the latest on August 11, 2015,85 under authority provided by the National 
Emergencies Act86 and the IEEPA,87 which provides that upon declaration of a 
national emergency with respect to an “unusual and extraordinary threat, which 
has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national 
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States,”88 the President may 
 
77. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–20. 
78. 15 C.F.R. § 730.2 (2015). 
79. Id. 
80. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, § 20, 93 Stat. 503, 535 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 2419 (2001)). 
81. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 98-108, § 1, 97 Stat. 744, 744 (1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419). 
82. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 103-277, 108 Stat. 1407 (1994) (reauthorizing EAA after four-day lapse); Pub. 
L. No. 98-207, 97 Stat. 1391 (1983) (reauthorizing EAA after seven-week lapse).  See generally IAN 
F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31832, THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT: EVOLUTIONS, 
PROVISIONS, AND DEBATE (2003). 
83. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2419 (2000). 
84. See FERGUSSON, supra note 82, at 3–5. 
85. Exec. Order No. 13,222, 66 Fed. Reg. 44,025 (Aug. 22, 2001). In that order, per section 202(d) of the 
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d), the President declared a national emergency with 
respect to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States in light of the 
expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979.  In 2015, President Obama renewed that order 
for an additional year. Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Export Control 
Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 48,233 (Aug. 11, 2015). 
86. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(d) (2015). 
87. Id. §§ 1701–07.   
88. Id. § 1701(a). 
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“regulate . . . exportation of . . . any property in which any foreign country or a 
national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”89  The validity of the extension of 
the EAA by Executive Order has been a subject of debate,90 but has generally been 
upheld.91    
IEEPA authorizes the imposition of criminal and administrative penalties for 
EAR violations.92  Violations of the EAR can result in criminal penalties of up to 
$1,000,000 and not more than 20 years’ imprisonment per violation,93 and civil 
penalties equal to the greater of $250,000 per violation or twice the value of the 
transaction that is the basis of the violation.94    
C. Debarment/Denial Orders and Designations Used by DDTC  
 and BIS 
Although the financial and reputational repercussions for violations of the EAR 
or ITAR are severe, an even more significant enforcement tool available to both 
DDTC and BIS is the authority to administratively prevent persons from exporting 
and re-exporting articles controlled by the ITAR and EAR by issuing a debarment 
 
89. Id. § 1702(a)(1)(B). 
90. See, e.g., Joel B. Harris & Jeffrey P. Bialos, The Strange New World of United States Export Controls 
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 71, 81 (1985); 
Matthew A. Goldstein, The Impact of Export Controls by Fiat, DEFENSE TRADE LAW BLOG (Nov. 24 
2014), http://bit.ly/1tH7F8y. 
91.E.g., Wisc. Project on Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 278 (D.C. Cir. 
2003) (holding expired provision of the EAA could provide the basis for the Department of 
Commerce to withhold certain export data under Exemption 3 of the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), which permits agencies to withhold records exempted from disclosure by statute); United 
States v. Groos, 616 F. Supp. 2d 777, 785–89 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (upholding extension of EAA by 
Executive Order under IEEPA and citing cases holding same).  But see Micei Int’l v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, 613 F.3d 1147, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding IEEPA does not authorize the President 
the authority to grant jurisdiction to any federal court and stating that “the executive order 
extending the export regulatory regime does not confer direct-review jurisdiction upon this court. 
With the EAA in lapse and the general savings statute inapposite, no statute does either. 
Accordingly, we conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction. . . .”). 
92. 50 U.S.C. § 1705.   
93. Id. § 1705(c). 
94. Id. § 1705(b). 
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order95 or Temporary Denial Order (TDO)96 that can effectively put an exporter out 
of business.  DDTC and BIS may, respectively, also designate parties on the DDTC 
Debarred Parties List,97 which prohibits the listed party from participating in any 
ITAR-controlled activity,98 or the BIS Entity List,99which imposes a licensing 
requirement for certain exports or re-exports subject to the EAR.100   
Use or the threat of the use of TDOs and Entity List designations, among other 
types as well, has grown over the years as a powerful tool used to enhance U.S. law 
enforcement’s investigations of export control violations.101  These mechanisms are 
further enhanced by the government’s ability to immediately place a person or entity 
 
95. See 22 C.F.R. § 127.7(a) (2013) (for ITAR violations, the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-
Military Affairs may administratively debar, and thereby prohibit any person from activities 
subject to the ITAR for an appropriate time “which shall generally be for a period of three years”); 
Id. (reinstatement is not automatic, and the debarred person must submit a request for 
reimbursement and be reinstated before engaging in any ITAR-controlled activities). Persons 
convicted of violating or conspiring to violate AECA are subject to statutory debarment under 
127.7(b).  See also Lists of Parties Debarred Pursuant to the ITAR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS (Sept. 24, 2015), 
https://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/debar_intro.html; Interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 
71 (the yearly number of reinstatement requests submitted to DDTC were as follows:  FY2007: 2; 
FY2008: 0; FY2009: 53; FY2010: 2; FY2011: 4; FY2012: 0; FY2013: 3; and FY2014: 2). 
96. 15 C.F.R. § 766.24 (2010) (for EAR violations, the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement may 
issue or renew a TDO, denying any or all export privileges of a company or individual to prevent an 
imminent or on-going export control violation. TDOs are issued for a renewable 180-day period and 
cut off not only the right to export from the United States, but also the right to receive or participate 
in exports from the United States). 
97. 22 C.F.R. § 127.7(b); List of Statutorily Debarred Parties, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIRECTORATE OF 
DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS (Apr. 15, 2015), http://1.usa.gov/1xBUHHm.  
98. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(c)(2)-(d). 
99. 15 C.F.R. pt. 744 (Supp. IV 2014). 
100. Id.; 22 C.F.R. § 127.1. 
101. Upon announcing an indictment in the case of United States v. Fishenko, No. 1:12-cr-00626 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012), against eleven members of a Russian military procurement network 
operating in the United States and Russia, as well as a Texas-based export company and a Russia-
based procurement firm, for illegally exporting high-tech microelectronics from the United States 
to Russian military and intelligence agencies, BIS took the historic step of adding at one time 165 
foreign persons and companies to the Entity List who received, transshipped, or otherwise 
facilitated the export of controlled commodities by the defendants.  See also United States v. Li 
Fangwei, No. 1:14-cr-00144-LAP (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2014) (U.S. Department of Commerce 
designation to the Entity List of nine China-based suppliers to Li Fangwei at the same time 
criminal charges were announced); United States v. Balli Aviation, No. 1:09-c-r-00366 (D.D.C. Dec. 
22, 2009) (issuing TDO against Balli defendants and others prior to criminal charges); Iran 
Sanctions: Ensuring Robust Enforcement, and Assessing Next Steps: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 44 (June 4, 2013) (statement of Eric L. 
Hirschhorn, Under Sec’y of Commerce for Industry and Security) (“Because companies and banks 
worldwide screen against [the Entity] list, publicly naming entities involved in illicit export activity 
helps prevent export violations by discouraging resellers and other parties from doing business with 
targeted entities and the procurement networks of which they are a part.”).  Interview with Sue 
Gainor, supra note 71 (the yearly number of statutory debarments issued by DDTC were as follows:  
FY2007: 23; FY2008: 0; FY2009: 53; FY2010: 56; FY2011: 0; FY2012: 111; FY2013: 22; and FY2014: 
0).   
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on an excluded party list merely by sending a “notice of proposed debarment” 
without providing the person or entity any due process, including the ability to 
present any information to the government.102  In practice, it is much easier for a 
person or entity to be designated than it is for a person or entity to challenge 
successfully the designation by BIS or DDTC. 
III. Current Export Control Enforcement Agencies 
In the United States, the export laws and regulations are enforced by two 
methods which are not mutually exclusive: civil and criminal enforcement. The two 
primary civil enforcement agencies for export control laws are the Departments of 
Commerce and State. The agencies involved in criminal enforcement of export 
control laws, however, are numerous, and include the Department of Commerce (but 
not the Department of State) and a host of other law enforcement agencies, as well 
as the Department of Justice Counterintelligence and Export Control Section103 with 
specialized prosecutorial expertise for export control cases. 
While many Americans may not be aware of the threat presented by those seeking 
to obtain unlawfully export controlled items from the United States, law 
enforcement agencies often encounter sophisticated persons and global networks 
motivated often by profit or ideology to circumvent U.S. export control regulations.104  
Ryan Fayhee, former National Export Coordinator for the Department of Justice, 
described the challenge for enforcement agencies: 
Proliferators spearheading [] procurement networks are able to 
quickly locate products for sale anywhere in the world with just a 
few keystrokes.  They are then able to communicate that 
information via email to their middlemen overseas and direct them 
to specific U.S. suppliers.  These foreign middlemen agents may 
change their names frequently and may never see or touch the 
products they order from the United States.  They work in 
conjunction with freight forwarders, who at their instruction remove 
and replace the inbound shipping records with outbound shipping 
 
102. Jared Serbu, Suspension and Debarments Rise Amid Pressure from Congress, FEDERAL NEWS 
RADIO (June 14, 2012), http://bit.ly/1HoOcMx. 
103. National Security Division, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/nsd (last visited Nov. 12, 
2015). 
104. A review of the Department of Justice’s summary of enforcement cases involving export control 
prosecutions shows that even in a heightened enforcement environment, the Justice Department 
has not exercised its prosecutorial discretion to focus on cases involving dual-use goods being 
exported to European Union or other close economic and security partners of the United States.  
Instead, most cases prosecuted by the Justice Department involve countries where there are arms 
embargoes, such as China, sponsor terrorism, such as Iran, involve restricted persons or entities, 
or involve illegal gun trafficking across the border. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY 
OF MAJOR U.S. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE, TRADE SECRET AND EMBARGO-
RELATED CRIMINAL CASES (2015).  
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records to facilitate the transshipment of the goods to prohibited 
end-users.  The location of the middlemen may or may not be in the 
same country as the shipping route of the goods or the flow of 
money.105 
Often this is done without knowledge of the U.S. companies involved in the 
transactions.106   
Generally, to determine liability for an export control transaction civil and 
criminal enforcement agencies examine whether:  
(1) U.S. government authorization was required for the transaction;  
(2) authorization existed, and covered the relevant conduct; and   
(3) the party knowingly and willfully failed to obtain authorization 
or to adhere to the authorization provided. 107   
The existence of the first two elements is typically sufficient for the government 
to allege a civil violation on a strict liability basis,108 and the existence of evidence 
demonstrating intent would allow the government to allege a criminal violation has 
occurred as well.109  While this basic overview is simplified here, the regulations that 
determine whether a transaction may require a license are complex. 
Enforcement cases may begin in any number of ways: anonymous tips to agency 
hotlines;110 leads driven by the CBP on out-bound shipments;111 voluntary self-
disclosures filed by companies or persons that identify other companies or persons; 
subpoenas issued to companies;112 search warrants resulting in leads of potential 
 
105. Ryan Fayhee, Extradition in Export Enforcement Cases, 61 U.S. ATTORNEYS’ BULL. 1, 2 (2013). 
106. Robert S. Mueller III, FBI Director, Remarks at the U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry 
and Security Annual Update Conference on Export Controls and Policy (July 18, 2012), available 
at http://1.usa.gov/1B0bDK2 (“We do recognize that genuine mistakes do occur. In many instances, 
there is no knowledge on the part of the exporter that a violation is underway. That is one reason 
why these cases are so challenging for us.”). 
107. See, e.g., United States v. Homa Int’l Trading Corp., 387 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2004); United States 
v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Habibion, No. 1:11-cr-00118-ESH 
(D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2011) (government’s proposed jury instructions). 
108. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a)–(b) (2007); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(c) (1988); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(a) (2013); 22 C.F.R. 
§ 127.10 (2013); 31 C.F.R. pt. 501, app. A (2009). 
109. See 22 C.F.R. § 127.1 (2013); Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating criminal 
conviction under AECA “entails proof of four elements: the (1) willful (2) export or attempted export 
(3) of articles listed on the United States Munitions List (4) without a license”); United States v. 
Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 1988); 22 C.F.R. § 127.1 (2013); Fifth Circuit Pattern Criminal 
Jury Instructions § 2.93 (2012).  
110. Mark Schapiro, The Middleman, MOTHER JONES, June 2005, available at http://bit.ly/1zN5cGn 
(discussing anonymous sources that led to prosecution of Asher Karni for export control violations). 
111. Miller & Chevalier, CBP Identifies Most Common Reasons for Outbound Detentions and Seizures, 
MILLER CHEVALIER (Aug. 10, 2010), http://bit.ly/1IdMBYy. 
112. The Commerce Department and State Department can subpoena books and records of parties 
to export transactions for use in civil and administrative proceedings.  See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e) 
(2014); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2411 (2004).  
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export control violations;113 negative post-shipment or pre-shipment verifications;114 
statements made by companies regarding detained shipments;115 leads generated 
from industry outreach visits conducted by law enforcement;116 confidential 
informants within industry;117 inspections of shipments;118 whistleblowers or 
disgruntled employee;119 press reports;120 undercover operations with the full range 
of authorities administered by DHS or FBI;121 evidence received from other non-
export control cases, such as money laundering or sanctions matters;122 submissions 
made by companies trying to have names removed from the Entity List or a TDO; 
and observations made by immigration officers at ports of entry or during secondary 
screenings.123   
 
113. United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550, 557–58 (D. Mass. 1983) (upholding a search 
warrant that sought “records which are required under the Export Administration Act . . . by 
all businesses sending electronic equipment outside of the United States”).  
114. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-613, EXPORT CONTROLS: U.S. AGENCIES NEED TO 
ASSESS CONTROL LIST REFORM’S IMPACT ON COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES 16 (2012) [hereinafter 
REFORM’S IMPACT ON COMPLIANCE ACTIVITIES] (“The three locations where [the U.S. Department 
of Commerce] conducted site visits—Hong Kong, Singapore, and UAE—represented about 36 
percent of Commerce end-use checks conducted globally for this period and nearly 62 percent of 
unfavorable determinations worldwide.”). 
115. United States v. Yip, No. 5:11-cr-00516 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2012). 
116. See, e.g., John T. Morton, Director, ICE, Remarks Prepared for the Wash. Inst. for Near East Pol’y 
(Sept. 2, 2010), http://bit.ly/1Kd9Up1 (discussing industry outreach visit leading to arrest for 
violations of export control laws). 
117. See, e.g., id. (discussing tip from confidential informant leading to arrest of individual for export 
control violations). 
118. 15 C.F.R. § 758.7(b)(5) (2014) (inspection authority under the EAR); 22 C.F.R. § 127.4 (2013) 
(inspection authority under ITAR); see, e.g., United States v. Khazaee, No. 3:14-cr-00009 (D. 
Conn. Jan. 21, 2014) (indicted former defense contractor engineer for export control violations 
after inspection of a shipment to a freight forwarder bound for Iran located boxes of sensitive 
technical manuals, specification sheets, and other propriety material relating to the U.S. Air 
Force’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program); see also United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 
(1977) (noting that the “longstanding recognition that searches at our borders without probable 
cause and without a warrant are nonetheless ‘reasonable’ has a history as old as the Fourth 
Amendment itself”). 
119. See, e.g., Jared Serbu, FBI Investigating NASA Whistleblower Reports of Chinese Data Breach, 
FEDERAL NEWS RADIO (Mar. 8, 2013, 5:13 AM), http://bit.ly/1Ad0x5z. 
120. David W. Mills, Assistant Sec’y for Export Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Keynote Speech 
at BIS Annual Update Conference (July 30, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1Bfvsvk (“OEE has initiated a 
number of investigations based on press reporting and information released on the internet by 
opposition members and internet hackers that identified the presence of U.S. equipment in Syria 
and in Iran.”). 
121. See, e.g., United States v. Jangraw, No. 1:14-cr-00174-JEB (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2014); United States v. 
Bo Cai, No. 1:13-cr-04044-MV (D.N.M. July 23, 2014). 
122. See, e.g., Press Release, Chesterfield Man Sentenced to 18 Months in Prison for Theft of DuPont 
Trade Secrets, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 18, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2012/03/15/mitchellSent.pdf (noting 
that charges of trade secret theft led to investigation of export control violations). 
123. See Press Release, California Couple Charged with Conspiring to Export Sensitive Technology to 
People’s Republic of China, U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (Oct. 15, 2010), available at 
https://www.fbi.gov/losangeles/press-releases/2010/la101510-1.htm (“U.S. Customs and Border 
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With these numerous pipelines of information also comes a number of 
overlapping U.S. Government enforcement agencies with potential jurisdiction over 
the investigation, including the Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland 
Security, and Justice.  Each Department also inevitably includes different agencies 
and sections separately responsible for different aspects of export control.  The three 
law enforcement agencies most often involved in investigating export control 
violations are (1) DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation,124 (2) Homeland Security’s 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),125 including Homeland Security 
Investigations (HSI), a division of ICE,126 and (3) Commerce’s BIS Office of Export 
Enforcement (OEE).127  OEE investigative authority is limited to investigating 
violations of the EAR and IEEPA, which can involve separate investigations of other 
statutes related to the illegal export of an item controlled under the EAR.128 FBI and 
HSI, in contrast, have broader authority, authorizing them to investigate all export 
regulation violations, as well as many other federal statutes.129 
With the number of enforcement agencies that can be involved in export control 
matter, the intersections that can occur with ongoing intelligence priorities and 
foreign policy, and the number of different licensing regimes, inter-agency 
 
Protection officials stopped the engineers upon their return to the United States and allegedly found 
computer files and documents indicating illegal technology transfer involving GTSI and China.”). 
124. What We Investigate, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://1.usa.gov/1kCPIgu (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2015).  
125. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, tit. IV, § 442, 116 Stat. 2135, 2193.  That 
Act created the Bureau of Border Security, which has since been renamed ICE.  Name Change 
From the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, 72 Fed. Reg. 20,131 (Apr. 23, 2007).  
126. History: HSI – Historic Origins, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/hsi (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (“In 2010, HSI was formed within ICE from 
elements of ICE’s previous Offices of Investigations, Intelligence and International Affairs.”); 
ICE Realigns Itself, But Won’t Call It a Restructuring, SISKIND’S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN, June 
30, 2010, http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/siskinds-immigration-bulletin-june-30-66644/ 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2015) (“Immigrations and Customs Enforcement announced to its 
employees this week that it will realign its offices under three new directorates: Homeland 
Security Investigations, Enforcement and Removal Operations and Management 
Administration.”). 
127. Office of Export Enforcement, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, 
http://1.usa.gov/1zOQJcL (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
128. Export Control Enforcement, EXPORT.GOV, http://1.usa.gov/1BrwNRx (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
129. Id.; 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(d) (1997) (FBI has authority to investigate violations of the AECA, EAA, 
TWEA, and IEEPA if the investigation relates “to any foreign counterintelligence matter.”); 
Overview: HSI – A Diverse, Global Force, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/hsi (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (ICE and HSI have “broad legal authority to 
enforce a diverse array of federal statutes,” including “Financial crimes, money laundering and bulk 
cash smuggling; Commercial fraud and intellectual property theft; Cybercrimes; Human rights 
violations; Human smuggling and trafficking; Immigration, document and benefit fraud; Narcotics 
and weapons smuggling/trafficking; Transnational gang activity; Export enforcement; and, 
International art and antiquity theft.”). 
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coordination has always been critical to successful enforcement.  One of the 
identified goals of the President’s ECR is to create a single primary enforcement 
coordination agency to reduce the number of separate law enforcement agencies 
with jurisdiction over investigations of export control violations.  The Administration 
proposed that it would, during the third and final ECR phase, “seek legislation that 
would merge the Department of Commerce’s criminal investigative function into a 
single dedicated export enforcement unit in DHS/ICE and stand up a new 
consolidated administrative enforcement unit comprising compliance and 
enforcement officials from Commerce and State in the Single Control Agency.”130  
The President has observed that “[a] multitude of agencies—Commerce, Defense, 
Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury—each have authority to 
investigate and/or enforce some or all of the three licensing agencies’ export controls 
[and that] [a]ll these departments operate on a number of separate information 
technology (IT) systems.”131  The obvious disadvantage of this arrangement is that  
multiple departments and agencies with full, partial, or tangential 
involvement with export enforcement can be confusing, both within 
and outside the U.S. Government (USG), including with foreign law 
enforcement authorities, and has resulted in occasionally disjointed 
and inefficient USG-wide export enforcement efforts, including 
inadvertent ‘blue on blue’ instances where one law enforcement 
agency negatively impacts the investigation of another law 
enforcement agency.132   
Current export control enforcement methods also have been criticized by the 
General Accountability Office (GAO) as being overly complex,133 and numerous 
reforms have been proposed.134  GAO has noted that export control enforcement 
involve multiple agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that “carry out various 
activities, including inspecting shipments, investigating potential export control 
violations, and taking punitive actions that can be criminal or administrative 
 
130. Export Control Reform Initiative Fact Sheet #6, supra note 11; see also IAN F. FERGUSSON & PAUL 
K. KERR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41916, THE U.S. EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM AND THE 
PRESIDENT’S REFORM INITIATIVE 11 (2014) (“While the Administration has not proffered specific 
details about this new agency, it is expected to take over the licensing functions of BIS, DDTC, and 
OFAC. Civil and administrative enforcement functions of BIS and DDTC are likely to be housed in 
the new unified licensing agency.”); id. at 20 (“ICE conducts investigations and criminal 
enforcement for DDTC and OFAC, and by virtue of its authority under the IEEPA, it shares dual-
use investigations with OEE. Removal of OEE to ICE will end this overlap of authority.”). 
131. Export Control Reform Initiative Fact Sheet #1, supra note 16.  
132. Export Control Reform Initiative Fact Sheet #6, supra note 11.  
133. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-278, GAO’S HIGH-RISK SERIES, AN UPDATE 107–09 
(2011); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-265, EXPORT CONTROLS: CHALLENGES EXIST 
IN ENFORCEMENT OF AN INHERENTLY COMPLEX SYSTEM 2–3 (2006). 
134. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PROPOSED REFORMS CREATE OPPORTUNITIES, supra 
note 12, at 28. 
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against violators of export control laws and regulations.”135  The focus of the 
criticism, however, was not on the mere existence of several different enforcement 
agencies with overlapping jurisdiction,136 but on the risk of those agencies not 
coordinating or doing so inefficiently in such a high stakes area with national 
security and foreign policy implications. 
A. Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation 
The FBI, with over 35,000 employees and well over 13,000 Special Agents,137 has 
authority to investigate almost all Federal crimes, but when investigating export 
control violations, it most often involves classified information and “a nexus with 
foreign counterintelligence.”138 As of two years ago, the FBI had over 1,500 pending 
cases that involved export control-related violations.139 The former Director of the 
FBI Robert Mueller noted at a recent BIS conference, “Now, what does the FBI bring 
to the table? We are one of several agencies responsible for the enforcement of export 
control laws and regulations.  Our primary interest relates to export matters with a 
national security nexus.”140 As national security threats have changed, the FBI has 
found export control laws as a useful tool to combat theft of sensitive data and 
cyberespionage cases.141   
 
135. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EXPORT CONTROLS: CHALLENGES EXIST IN ENFORCEMENT OF 
AN INHERENTLY COMPLEX SYSTEM, supra note 133, at 7. 
136. Export controls is by no means the only area where multiple law enforcement agencies share 
overlapping jurisdiction.  See Robert S. Mueller, III, Director of FBI, Remarks at the 15th 
Annual RSA Conference, San Jose, CA (Feb. 15, 2006), available at 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/protecting-cyberspace-by-working-together-and-sharing-
information (“The FBI and the Secret Service share federal jurisdiction for investigating 
cybercrime; our roles in detecting and suppressing computer-based crimes are complementary. 
We must continue to share information and resources.”); E.g., Joe Palazzolo, Rival Agencies 
Agree to Halt Turf Battles, MAINJUSTICE.COM (Aug. 10, 2009), http://bit.ly/1tTpbql (the Drug 
Enforcement Agency and ICE have overlapping jurisdiction over drug cases). 
137. Frequently Asked Questions, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://1.usa.gov/1yswtST (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2015) (On October 31, 2013, a total of 35,344 people worked for the FBI, including 
13,598 special agents and 21,746 professional staff.). 
138. FBI has authority to investigate violations of AECA and IEEPA if the investigation relates “to any 
foreign counterintelligence matter.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(d) (1997).  See, e.g., Delegations of Authority; 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 69 Fed. Reg. 65,542 (Nov. 15, 2004); BERT CHAPMAN, EXPORT 
CONTROLS: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 166 (2013).   
139. Mueller, supra note 106. 
140. Id.  
141. In United States v. Chung, a Boeing engineer and naturalized U.S. citizen was identified by the 
FBI from evidence obtained in an export control investigation as a suspect who was being tasked 
by the Chinese government to obtain restricted technology and trade secrets relating to the Space 
Shuttle’s Delta IV rocket. See Press Release, Former Boeing Engineer Convicted of Economic 
Espionage in Theft of Space Shuttle Secrets for China, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 16, 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-boeing-engineer-convicted-economic-espionage-theft-space-
shuttle-secrets-china; see also United States v. Liu, No. 2:11-cr-00208-SRC (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2013) 
(convicted former L3 engineer and sentenced to 70 months in prison for exporting controlled 
14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2015) 
22 
The FBI places export control enforcement in its Counterproliferation Center at 
FBI Headquarters, which brings together the expertise of its Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Division and Counterintelligence Division.142   
The “dual hat” that the FBI wears often places it in a unique position to provide 
valuable intelligence to the intelligence community about transshipment networks, 
technology of concern, and intersections with other intelligence priorities.143  Over 
the years, the FBI has found value in reviewing export control cases begun in other 
agencies, such as OEE, both from intelligence and law enforcement perspectives, 
watching illicit procurement networks, and sometimes pursuing them with criminal 
arrests and charges.  On export control cases that the FBI jointly investigates, there 
can be tension with other law enforcement agencies, because the FBI’s interests in 
learning the complex tradecraft of how export-controlled data was stolen or how a 
procurement network operated, for example, are not always entirely aligned with 
agencies more interested in returning criminal charges.  As both a law enforcement 
agency and a member of the U.S. intelligence community, the FBI must often 
balance these two priorities.144   
The FBI has the unique ability to obtain and use search warrants or Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act warrants145 in export control cases, and broad access 
 
military technology to China, stealing trade secrets, and lying). 
142. After the National Export Control Coordinator was appointed, on October 11, 2007, the U.S.  
Department of Justice announced a National Counter-Proliferation Initiative (CPI).  See Press 
Release, Justice Department and Partner Agencies Launch National Counter-Proliferation 
Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (Oct. 11, 2007), http://1.usa.gov/13Rb48I.  At the date of the CPI 
announcement, ICE had doubled the number of agents assigned to export control cases and reports 
making 149 export-related arrests last fiscal year and FBI reported that it is investigating roughly 
125 economic espionage cases and has increased counterintelligence instruction for new agents by 
240 percent.  Id.  In announcing CPI, the Assistant Attorney General for National Security stated: 
“The threat posed by illegal foreign acquisition of restricted U.S. technology is substantial and 
growing.”  Id.  The FBI’s prioritization and additional resources provided to combat cybercrime and 
cyberespionage will certainly have significant and continued intersections with export control 
enforcement. See, e.g., David W. Mills, Assistant Sec’y for Export Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, Remarks Before the West Coast Export Enforcement Forum (Feb. 25, 2014), 
http://1.usa.gov/1wfHNvV (“Let me be clear, the theft of export controlled information from your 
computer systems as a result of foreign cyber actors is a threat to U.S. national security interests 
and your company’s competitive lifeblood: intellectual property.”). 
143. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PROPOSED REFORMS CREATE OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 12, 
at 12 (“The FBI, with both an investigative and intelligence mission, does not allocate resources 
solely for export control enforcement and officials told us they view these activities as a tool to gain 
intelligence that may lead to more robust cases.”). 
144.See 50 U.S.C. § 3041 (2007); see also Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981) (the 
National Security Act of 1947, as amended, designated the FBI as a member of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community and Executive Order 12,333 and the Attorney General Guidelines for Domestic 
Operations, appoint the FBI as the lead domestic agency for conducting counterintelligence 
activities); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FBI, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE 
(2011). 
145.The FBI is authorized to apply for search warrants, and to apply for Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
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to classified information, where other agencies may not be authorized by similar 
authorities or have the same type of access to critical information in the intelligence 
community.146  Given this role, the FBI, as with HSI, has historically had a liaison 
agent at DDTC and in the last several years has developed a closer working 
relationship with OEE.147 
B. Department of Homeland Security:  Immigration & Customs  
 Enforcement (ICE) and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)  
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) enforces federal laws 
governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration to promote homeland 
security and public safety.  ICE was created in 2003 through a merger of the 
investigative and interior enforcement elements of the former U.S. Customs Service 
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. ICE now has more than 20,000 
employees in more than 400 offices in the United States and 48 foreign countries.  
The agency has an annual budget of approximately $6 billion, primarily devoted to 
two operational directorates — Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and 
Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO).  A third directorate, Management and 
Administration (M&A), is charged with providing professional management and 
mission support to advance the ICE mission.148 
HSI is an investigative arm of DHS and focuses on combating criminal 
organizations illegally exploiting the United States’ travel, trade, financial, and 
immigration systems.  HSI’s workforce includes special agents, analysts, auditors, 
and support staff. HSI has broad legal authority to enforce a diverse array of federal 
statutes involving cross-border activity, including violations of the ITAR and EAR.  
HSI’s historical legacy connection with CBP,149 a liaison role with DDTC, significant 
 
Act warrants.  50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2015).  OEE agents do not have that authority, and must 
seek assistance from FBI when an OEE investigation justifies warrants.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Shu Quan-Sheng, No. 2:08-cr-00194 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 2009) (conviction of naturalized U.S. citizen 
and Ph.D. physicist for illegally exporting space launch technical data and services to PRC and 
offering bribes to Chinese government officials). 
146. See generally John Shiffman & Duff Wilson, Turf Battles Hinder U.S. Efforts to Thwart Smugglers, 
REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2013), http://reut.rs/1BdO6nf (“Each agency also has distinct crime-fighting 
powers. Only FBI agents can deploy Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act wiretaps. Only 
Commerce agents can issue administrative sanctions. Only Homeland Security agents can search 
packages at the border without a warrant. State and Treasury officials who are not federal agents 
can issue administrative and financial sanctions for regulatory violations.”). 
147. Interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 71.   
148. See generally Who We Are, U.S DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.ice.gov/about (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
149. The EAA was first passed in 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 98 Stat. 503, and amended in 1985 with the 
passage of the EAA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120.  See EAA history, supra notes 
25–29 and accompanying text.  Congress and the President recognized the overlap of enforcement 
authorities between OEE and Customs and attempted to clarify investigative roles between 
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presence overseas, and administration of the new Export Enforcement Coordination 
Center (E2C2), which was created by the President’s Executive Order, are all 
considerable benefits in export control enforcement cases.  According to HSI, its 
ability and expertise in conducting undercover operations has also given it an 
advantage over other agencies, such as OEE, that lack that capability.150  In United 
States v. Ardebili,151 for example, HSI agents used undercover tactics to lure out of 
Iran and arrest an Iranian arms dealer for violations of U.S. export control laws.152  
 
domestic and foreign investigations.  In the legislative history for the Export Administration 
Amendments Act of 1985, Section 12(a) of the Act was amended to clarify enforcement authorities. 
The legislative history explains Section 12(a) was drafted to “clarify as precisely as possible in 
statutory language the relationship between the Department of Commerce and the Customs 
Service in enforcing the [Export Administration Act].”  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-180, at 62 (1985), 
reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 108, 124.  The enforcement authorities were clarified in the history 
as follows: 
 With respect to overseas enforcement activities, the conferees intend that the Customs Service have 
the primary enforcement responsibility, particularly in countries where the Customs Services has 
an enforcement agreement with the host government. The Commerce Department’s overseas 
enforcement role is limited to those areas discussed infra.  It is intended that investigations beyond 
U.S. borders of allegations of wrongdoing should be investigated by the Customs Service . . . . [T]he 
Commerce Department’s overseas enforcement activities shall consist of alleged boycott violation 
investigations[,] . . . investigations of firms prior to the issuance of a license which the firm has 
applied for, or for which the firm is indicated to be the overseas consignee and post-shipment 
verifications.  
 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 99-180, at 62–63 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 124–25; see also 
Enforcement Responsibilities of Commerce and Customs Under the Export Administration Act, 50 
Fed. Reg. 41,545 (Oct. 11, 1985) (noting that Commerce and Customs may conduct EAA 
investigations “either independently or jointly, and Commerce shall focus its efforts on the discovery 
and deterrence of domestic circumvention of the export licensing system” and requiring that if 
Commerce discovers an allegation of evidence of wrongdoing outside the United States, it “shall 
promptly inform Customs” and “Customs shall then be responsible for pursuing the foreign aspects 
of the investigation”).  
150. OEE officials disagree and note that OEE agents conduct undercover operations, but that they do 
not have the ability to collect any funds obtained from those operations.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Mangelsen, No. 4:02-cr-40026-JPG (S.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2002) (following OEE undercover operations 
indictment filed against individuals for conspiracy to defraud the United States in connection with 
diversion of unauthorized items to Libya which ultimately led to successful prosecution).  United 
States v. Mahmood, No. 1:04-cr-00365 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2006) (sentence of 17 months imposed for 
conspiracy to divert unauthorized items to Iran following OEE undercover operation). 
151. No. 1:07-cr-00155 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2009). 
152. John T. Morton, Combating Export Violations to Iran: The Role of ICE Homeland Security 
Investigations (Sept. 2, 2010), in WASH. INST. FOR NEAR EAST POL’Y, OBAMA’S NATIONAL SECURITY 
VISION: CONFRONTING TRANSNATIONAL THREATS WITH GLOBAL COOPERATION 11–12 (Dr. Matthew 
Levitt ed., 2010).  The use of undercover operations has had success, but may be more difficult to 
leverage in cases involving the illicit cyber intrusion of export-controlled data.  
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C. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Industry & Security’s Office 
 of Export Enforcement (OEE) 
The BIS Export Enforcement Division consists of the Office of Enforcement 
Analysis (OEA), the Office of Antiboycott Compliance (OAC), and the Office of 
Export Enforcement (OEE).  OEE was created by the Export Administration Act,153 
and its mission is to enforce export controls on dual-use and certain munitions items 
for the Department of Commerce through the EAR under the authority of the 
IEEPA.154  Several Commerce Department officials interviewed for this article 
acknowledge that OEE’s mission of enforcing export control violations is viewed by 
some as contrary to the Commerce Department’s role of promoting U.S. exports.155  
Scott B. Quehl, former Chief Financial Officer & Assistant Secretary for 
Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, countered that perception by observing 
that “Export Enforcement at BIS plays defense on the Commerce Department’s 
export promotion team.”156 
OEE conducts investigations of suspected violations, assists other law 
enforcement agencies with export violation investigations, reviews voluntary self-
disclosures submitted to BIS, and assists exporters with EAR compliance issues.157  
BIS’s Export Enforcement division has three program offices: the Office of Export 
Enforcement (OEE), the Office of Export Analysis (OEA), and the Office of 
Antiboycott Compliance (OAC).158  In December, 2014, BIS OEE employed 110 
Special Agents, and other administrative staff159 in OEE’s Washington, D.C. 
headquarters and in nine field offices across the United States.160  In contrast with 
 
153. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401–2420. 
154. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707. 
155. The sources of those comments asked not to be identified in this article.  
156. Interview with Scott B. Quehl, former Chief Financial Officer & Assistant Secretary for 
Administration, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 4, 2015).  
157. While the EAA has been expired, OEE agents have investigated EAR violations as deputized U.S. 
Marshalls.  Thomas M. deButts & Cecil Hunt, Department of Commerce Export Controls, in COPING 
WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 67 (Practicing Law Institute 2007) (“OEE special agents have been 
deputized by the U.S. Marshals Service during periods of lapse of the EAA, authorizing these agents 
to exercise full law enforcement powers with respect to laws enforced by BIS.”).  Only with the 
passage of Section 305 of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 
2010 were the full enforcement authorities contained in the lapsed EAA restored on a permanent 
bases.  See 22 U.S.C. § 8544 (2014). 
158. This article focuses on the functions of OEE and OEA.  OAC is charged with enforcing U.S. 
antiboycott laws that prohibit U.S. persons from participating in boycotts of other countries that 
the United States does not support. 
159. Interview with Douglas R. Hassebrock, Director, Office of Export Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 10, 2014).  This number of agents is too few to fully perform 
its mission, in the opinion of its director.  Id.  
160. “OEE conducts its enforcement operation from its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and eight 
field offices located in Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Jose, and 
Washington, D.C., and a resident office in Houston.” BIS, Office of Export Enforcement, 
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DDTC’s compliance and enforcement employees, all OEE agents are “1811 Special 
Agents,”161 who are “sworn federal law enforcement officers with authority to carry 
firearms, make arrests, execute search warrants, serve subpoenas, detain and seize 
items suspected to be illegally exported, and order the redelivery to the United 
States of items exported in violation of U.S. law.” 162  Also different than DDTC 
compliance employees, who are all assigned to the Washington, D.C. headquarters, 
OEE agent assignments to field offices enable OEE agents to conduct frequent visits 
to the companies whose compliance they monitor.163   
OEE is the only group of government law enforcement agents dedicated solely to 
export control enforcement, as compared to ICE and HSI agents, who may be 
assigned to many other agency jurisdiction priorities.164  According to BIS officials, 
agents must go through rigorous training, including thirteen weeks at the Federal 
Law Enforcement Training Center and at least one year of on the job training to 
learn the regulations and understand enforcement techniques.  OEE agents have 
the primary responsibility for investigating violations of the EAR and where 
violations are significant from an administrative perspective or reveal evidence of 
 
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/enforcement/oee (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).  See also 
Investigations, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., http://1.usa.gov/1DbuukX 
(listing field offices) (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).  At the current time, OEE Special Agents have also 
been co-located with the FBI in its offices in Portland, Phoenix, Minneapolis, Cincinnati, and 
Atlanta and with the Department of Defense’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) in 
San Antonio.  U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., DON’T LET THIS HAPPEN TO 
YOU! ACTUAL INVESTIGATIONS OF EXPORT CONTROL AND ANTIBOYCOTT VIOLATIONS 10 (July 2014) 
[hereinafter DON’T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU!], http://1.usa.gov/1xwCgnF. 
161. The “1811” designation is a reference to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management General Schedule 
1811 series job description in the for “criminal investigators” and “covers positions which supervise, 
lead, or perform work involving planning, conducting, or managing investigations related to alleged 
or suspected criminal violations of Federal laws.”  U.S. OFFICE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 
HANDBOOK OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS AND FAMILIES 107 (May 2009), http://1.usa.gov/1vgFzzA.  
162. DON’T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU!, supra note 160, at 4; Investigations, supra note 159.  
163. DON’T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU!, supra note 160, at 17;  Interview with Douglas R. Hassebrock, 
supra note 158. 
164. Id. 
Defending the “Higher Walls” – The Effects of U.S. Export Control Reform on Export Enforcement 
27 
intentional violations of the EAR, the agents have the authority to recommend 
resolving the cases administratively165 or criminally.166 
The BIS Office of Enforcement Analysis broadly supports identifying and 
investigating potential illegal exports, reexports, and transfers by examining export-
related transactions, developing potential investigative leads, and providing case 
support to OEE agents.167  OEA has several divisions to support this mission, 
including the Strategic Intelligence Division, International Operations Division, 
Export Control Officer Program, and the Investigative Analysis Division.168   
Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement David Mills highlighted the benefits 
of the BIS model in his keynote remarks at the 2014 BIS Update Conference, noting 
that “over the last 32 years, BIS had evolved into a sophisticated law enforcement 
agency, with criminal investigators and enforcement analysts working together with 
licensing officers to identify violations and redress them” and that OEE agents were 
unique among Federal law enforcement agents for having the “subject matter 
 
165. See, e.g., DON’T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU!, supra note 160, at 51-52 (noting that in February 2014 
entity Intevac, Inc. assessed $115,000 civil penalty for releasing controlled technology classified as 
3E001 to a Russian national in Santa Clara, California facility without the required license from 
BIS); id. at 50 (noting that in August 2009 DHL Express (USA), et al. assessed a $9.4 million civil 
penalty for prohibited exports to several countries and the failure to retain export control documents 
required under the EAR); id. at 38 (noting that in August 2009 FMC Technologies, Inc. assessed a 
$610,000 civil penalty for exports and re-exports to a variety of countries of butterfly and check 
valves classified as 2B350); U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Order 
Relating to Ingersoll Machine Tools, Inc. 3 (Aug. 11, 2008), http://1.usa.gov/13Rjqx6 (assessing a 
$126,000 civil penalty for several deemed exports of production and development technology 
classified as 1E001 and 2E002 to Indian and Italian nationals). 
166. See, e.g., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Weatherford Services Ltd., No. 4:13-cr-
00733 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2013) (with no individuals charged, entering a deferred prosecution 
agreement and guilty pleas for export control, FCPA, and sanctions violations and assessment of 
$252,690,606 in civil and criminal penalties and fines); Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States 
v. Talebi, 1:12-cr-00295-LTS (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2013) (defendant sentenced to 12 months in prison 
for conspiring to illegally export from the United States to Iran parts and goods designed for use in 
industrial operations.); Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Hajian, No. 8:12-cr-00177-
VMC-TGW (M.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2012) (defendant sentenced to four years in prison and ordered to 
forfeit $10 million for conspiring to unlawfully export enterprise level computer and related 
equipment under ECCN 4A001 and EAR99 from the United States to Iran).  
167. See, e.g., DON’T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU!, supra note 160, at 6. 
168. The Strategic Intelligence Division examines industry information and intelligence and confirms 
the bona fides of the parties to license applications and allow BIS to make informed decisions on 
licensing issues. The International Operations Division screens BIS license applications and 
reviews export documentation for the purposes of identifying transactions or companies that may 
be selected for pre-license checks or post shipment verifications, collectively referred to as “end use 
checks.”  Id. at 6. The Export Control Officer Program consists of Special Agents, detailed to foreign 
embassies in currently six overseas locations: Beijing, Hong Kong, Dubai, New Delhi, Moscow and 
Singapore. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PROPOSED REFORMS CREATE OPPORTUNITIES, 
supra note 12, at 14.  The Investigative Analysis Division also provides research and analytical 
support on OEE investigations. DON’T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU!, supra note 160, at 6. 
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expertise in the area of export controls, coupled with [BIS’s] unique and 
complementary administrative enforcement tools.”169  
D. Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2) 
One of the four goals of ECR170 was to create a single “coordinating” enforcement 
agency to “enhance our enforcement efforts and minimize enforcement conflicts, . . . 
detect, prevent, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute violations of U.S. export control 
laws, and . . . share intelligence and law enforcement information related to these 
efforts to the maximum extent possible, consistent with national security and 
applicable law.”171  Secretary Gates remarked that “the coordination of our currently 
dispersed enforcement resources by one agency will do a great deal to strengthen 
enforcement, particularly abroad, as well as coordination with the intelligence 
community.  Those who endanger our troops and compromise our national security 
will not be able to hide behind jurisdictional uncertainties or game the system. 
Violators will be subject to thorough investigation, prosecution, and punishment 
severe enough to deter law breaking.”172   
On November 9, 2010, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,558 requiring 
the creation of a center administered by DHS to coordinate export enforcement, 
including industry outreaches, law enforcement actions, civil enforcement cases, 
prosecutions, and sharing of information with the intelligence community.173  To the 
extent a coordinating agency was the goal, this has been largely achieved by the 
Export Enforcement Coordination Center174 (sometimes abbreviated “EECC,” but 
 
169. Mills, supra note 142. 
170. Export Control Reform Initiative Fact Sheet #1, supra note 16 (Phase III will require legislation to 
implement a government reorganization that would consolidate the current system into a:  Single 
Control List; Single Licensing Agency; Single Primary Enforcement Coordination Agency; Single 
IT System.”). 
171. Exec. Order No. 13,558, 3 C.F.R. § 271 (2011). 
172. Gates, supra note 10. 
173. Exec. Order No. 13,558, 3 C.F.R. § 271.  In order to “enhance . . . enforcement efforts and minimize 
enforcement conflicts,” the order implores “executive departments and agencies [to] . . . coordinate 
their efforts to detect, prevent, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute violations of U.S. export control 
laws, and . . . share intelligence and law enforcement information related to these efforts to the 
maximum extent possible, consistent with national security and applicable law.”  Id. 
174. Denis McDonough, White House Chief of Staff, Remarks before the BIS Update Conference (July 
29, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1EH6oD7 (“By coordinating new export enforcement leads through the 
Coordination Center we have found that in 57 percent of new cases – another department or agency 
is either already working the lead, or has information that would be helpful to the new 
investigation. This is making us more efficient, effective… and in the end, keeping us safer.”); John 
Shiffman, New Anti-Smuggling Center Uncovers Internal Surprises, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2013), 
http://reut.rs/1zrWddf (quoting Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI Vincent Lisi as stating that 
the FBI was “surprised” to learn that there was a 60% match on E2C2 checks against information 
on an FBI target and as further stating that “I don’t know that anyone ever anticipated that it 
would be that high, especially when you consider the number of proliferators around the world 
Defending the “Higher Walls” – The Effects of U.S. Export Control Reform on Export Enforcement 
29 
most often referred to as “E2C2”).  “The E2C2 organization should not be confused 
with the office of National Export Control Coordinator, a position held by a 
Department of Justice chief prosecutor of export control enforcement, who has the 
authority to determine which cases to bring for criminal prosecution.”175 
During early ECR planning, questions about who would manage E2C2 and what 
its role would be generated interagency disputes.176  The reforms to the varying 
overlapping enforcement agencies responsible for export enforcement have largely 
focused on the Departments of State and Commerce.  There are significant 
differences between these Departments, and in particular, the approach each takes 
towards a potential violation.  These differences present significant challenges to 
merging the enforcement authority of just these two agencies, not considering the 
other Departments and agencies that participate in export control enforcement. 
One specific word in Executive Order 13,558 created its own controversy.  Was 
E2C2 intended by the Administration to be “the” point—or only “a” point of contact 
or conduit for law enforcement and/or the intelligence community?177  Because of 
concerns that the E2C2 might erode existing authorities of other law enforcement 
agencies, section 5(c) was added to the Executive Order, providing:  
Nothing in this order shall be construed to provide exclusive or 
primary investigative authority to any agency.  Agencies shall 
continue to investigate criminal and administrative export 
violations consistent with their existing authorities, jointly or 
separately, with coordination through the Center to enhance 
enforcement efforts and minimize potential for conflict.178   
Thus, regardless of which agency is given jurisdiction or deemed the “primary” 
enforcement agency, all agencies remain authorized to investigate export control 
cases.   
E2C2 adds the most value when it is able to detect potential conflicts or issues 
among and between investigations at an earlier stage, and resolve disputes among 
 
today. . . .  But again, proof’s in the pudding: right there is why we need the E2C2.”). 
175. FERGUSSON & KERR, supra note 130, at 20. The creation of E2C2 coincided with the departure of 
the first National Export Coordinator—whom DOJ has not replaced, perhaps due to the 
establishment of the E2C2.  Since Mr. Fayhee’s departure in this role, the DOJ’s National Security 
Division has been unclear on whether it intends to continue with the position of a National Export 
Coordinator. 
176. Interview with Jonathan C. Poling, Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, in 
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 23, 2014).  
177. Compare Exec. Order No. 13,558, 3 C.F.R. § 271(3)(a) (“The Center shall . . . serve as the primary 
forum within the Federal Government for executive departments and agencies to coordinate and 
enhance their export control enforcement efforts . . .), with id. at (3)(b) (“The Center shall . . . serve 
as a conduit between Federal law enforcement agencies . . .), and id. at (3)(c) (“The Center shall . . . 
serve as a primary point of contact between enforcement authorities and agencies engaged in export 
licensing.”) (emphases added). 
178. Exec. Order No. 13,558, 3 C.F.R. § 271(5)(c). 
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overlapping, competing agencies.  A great deal of time, talent, and money is invested 
by agencies into overlapping investigations, often resulting in competition and 
disputes among agencies.179  Occasionally, investigations involved the same 
agencies, but on different sides.  In one case, DHS and OEE, from their Chicago 
offices, were at odds with the Boston offices of DHS, OEE, and the FBI.180  The 
combination of agencies on a case generally benefits the investigation by preventing 
duplicative or conflicting investigations, leveraging the strengths and tools of each 
agency, and allowing new evidence uncovered by one team of agents to reveal 
previously unknown intersections with another team.   
According to several government officials interviewed by the authors, E2C2 has 
significantly improved resolving interagency disputes, but it is doubtful whether 
DHS has been provided the funding it needs to properly staff E2C2 to perform its 
full mission.  Although E2C2’s “deconfliction” role has been successful, investigators 
from other law enforcement agencies assigned to the E2C2 see their roles only as a 
liaisons with their home agencies—in other words, they are FBI or BIS assets first, 
and E2C2 assets second.  Law enforcement and intelligence databases have yet to 
be integrated into E2C2,181 so E2C2’s deconfliction role relies on the inefficient use 
of liaisons to inquire within their respective agencies for potential methods of 
resolving the conflicts.  The lack of statutory authority and funding of E2C2 means 
that E2C2 must for now rely on the willingness of independent agencies to resolve 
conflicts between competing agencies.182   
E. Other Enforcement Agencies 
Although FBI, HSI, and BIS are the three primary criminal enforcement 
agencies, other law enforcement agencies have had significant roles in export 
enforcement cases.  One of the world’s most notorious arms dealers, Victor Bout, was 
 
179. John Shiffman & Duff Wilson, Turf Battles Hinder U.S. Efforts to Thwart Smugglers, REUTERS 
(Dec. 17, 2013), http://reut.rs/1BdO6nf (“‘There was so much animosity over who is in charge and 
isn’t in charge, rather than over substance,’ said a White House counter-proliferation official.”).  But 
see E-mail from Douglas R. Hassebrock, Director, Office of Export Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce to Jonathan C. Poling, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Jan. 22, 2015) (on file 
with author) (“OEE has worked well with our partners and had great success in joint cases. As to 
the charges that the multitude of agencies has led to ‘confusion and problems,’ I must admit, that 
in my tenure as Director it’s just not been an issue. The E2C2 is a great forum to deconflict issues, 
but the more important matter is establishing close relationships with fellow agents so we can 
handle matters if they do come up in a sensible manner.”). 
180. Interview with Jonathan C. Poling, Partner, supra note 176; see also Michael Froman, U.S. Trade 
Rep., Remarks at the Bureau of Industry and Security Update Conference on Export Controls and 
Policy (July 24, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/1GX2qs0 (noting the “significant potential that the 
uncoordinated actions of one agency might jeopardize the investigation of another”). 
181. See FERGUSSON & KERR, supra note 130, at 20–21. 
182. See id. 
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apprehended and arrested by agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency, and charged 
with, among other things, conspiracy to acquire and export a missile system 
designed to destroy aircraft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332g1.183  The Air Force 
Office of Special Investigations was instrumental in the investigation and arrest of 
Noshir S. Gowadia, who illegally transmitted to the People’s Republic of China 
sensitive and highly controlled technology relating to the B-2 Spirit Stealth 
Bomber.184  The Department of Defense’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service 
(DCIS) was part of the investigation team that secured the then record setting $100 
million guilty plea against ITT Corporation for illegally exporting night vision goggle 
technology to China, Singapore, and the United Kingdom.185  Other DCIS cases have 
started as procurement fraud cases while DCIS investigated companies subject to 
the Buy American Act that illegally outsourced the production of materials to foreign 
countries, and in doing so, illegally transferred export controlled technical data to 
manufacture the items.186 
Many complex export control cases have involved cooperation and coordination 
among and between different enforcement agencies.187  The involvement of several 
law enforcement agencies is often required, because different law enforcement 
agencies have differing capabilities and limits on their authority—all of which may 
be needed on more complex cases.  For instance, in United States v. Chitron 
 
183. See, e.g., Press Release, International Arms Dealer Viktor Bout Convicted in New York of Terrorism 
Crimes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, (Nov. 2, 2011), http://1.usa.gov/13FrtN7; Indictment, United States 
v. Bout, No. 1:08-cr-00365 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2008).  After Bout’s conviction was affirmed, 731 F.3d 
233 (2d Cir. 2013), he has sought a new trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence, Jonathan 
Stempel, Arms Dealer Bout Seeks New Trial, Hires Ashcroft Law Firm, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://reut.rs/17dUNwv.   
184. Indictment, United States v. Gowadia, No. 1:05-cr-004866 (D. Haw. Nov. 8, 2005). 
185. Plea Agreement, United States v. ITT Corp., No. 7:07-cr-00022 (W.D. Va. Mar. 28, 2007). 
186. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Robert, No. 3:13-cr-00671 (D.N.J. Oct. 10, 2013) (DCIS  and 
HSI investigation that led to the indictment of New Jersey defense contractor that illegally 
transmitted technical data to India to manufacture the products outside the United States and in 
order to submit bids to foreign governments and foreign customers); Plea Agreement, United States 
v. Precision Image Corp., No. 13-cr-00226 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 2013) (arrested by NCIS and HSI 
and convicted for illegally exporting technical data to Taiwan to manufacturer supply circuit boards 
for the U.S. Navy). See generally PROPOSED REFORMS CREATE OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 12, at 
14–16 (discussing law enforcement agencies working through local task forces in the United States 
on export control enforcement cases).  
187. In United States v. Roth, No. 3:08-cr-00069 (E.D. Tenn. May 20, 2008), FBI, HSI, AFOSI, and OEE 
worked to secure the arrest and conviction of Reece Roth, Ph.D., an adjunct professor of the 
University of Tennessee, for allowing two foreign national students to access export controlled data 
and equipment, and export some of the data from the contract on a trip to China in violation of the 
AECA.  This case marked the first ever prosecution of a university professor for the transfer of 
controlled technology to a foreign student.  See Press Release, Former University of Tennessee 
Professor John Reece Roth Begins Serving Four-Year Prison Sentence on Convictions of Illegally 
Exporting Military Research Data, FBI (Feb. 1, 2012), http://1.usa.gov/1H5N5B2. 
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Electronics Company Ltd.,188 an extensive joint investigation by federal agents of 
OEE, HSI, FBI, and DCIS resulted in the conviction of Chitron-U.S., Inc., and two 
named defendants, Zhen Zhou Wu and his ex-wife, Yufeng Wei, for violating U.S. 
export control laws by illegally exporting sensitive electronics from the U.S. to China 
for the PRC military.189 
IV. Voluntary Disclosure & Compliance Review Process 
DDTC and BIS authorize and encourage exporters to voluntarily disclose export 
violations.  The ITAR and EAR contain instructions for preparing and submitting 
voluntary disclosures,190 and imply—but not promise—that a voluntary disclosure 
is a mitigating factor that may result in lesser penalties, but warn that failure to 
report known violations will be an adverse factor, as failure to report such violations 
may be detrimental to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests.191  
Disclosures of violations will be deemed by the agencies to be voluntary only if 
disclosed before the government obtains knowledge from other sources.192  Despite 
the possible mitigation of penalties by disclosing violations, some individuals are 
reluctant to do so, especially in more egregious cases not otherwise likely be 
discovered by the government, as the disclosure may waive an individual disclosing 
party’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination.193  Another deterrent to 
voluntary disclosures of serious violations likely to result in penalties is that an 
 
188. United States v. Wu, No. 1:08-cr-10386 (D. Mass. Dec. 18, 2008). 
189. United States v. Wu, 711 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013). 
190. 22 C.F.R. § 127.12(c)(2) (2012); 15 C.F.R. § 764.5(c) (2013). 
191. 22 C.F.R. § 127.12(a); 15 C.F.R. § 764.5(b)(4). But see 15 C.F.R. § 764.5(b)(1) (stating that the 
provisions of § 764.5 do not apply to disclosures of violations relating to EAR part 760 (Restrictive 
Trade Practices or Boycotts)).  There has been disagreement as to whether a disclosure covers 
individual liability of employees.    See, e.g., United States v. Gormley, 2:12-cr-00423-GP (E.D. Pa. 
Jan. 18, 2013) (sentencing a trade compliance official for export control violations to 42 months in 
prison, despite disclosure of his violations by his employer); U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, Consent Agreement, BAE Sys. PLC (May 16, 2011), http://1.usa.gov/1HbV2F6; 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Consent Agreement, Xe Servs. LLC (Aug. 
18, 2010), http://1.usa.gov/149npWw; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
Consent Agreement, ITT Corp. (Dec. 21, 2007), http://1.usa.gov/1CQf34i; see also Liebman, 
Thomsen & Bartlett, supra note 6, at § 5.05[2] (“[I]t appears that BIS is operating from the premise 
that all violations should attract the maximum penalties, and that a voluntary disclosure simply 
reduces them slightly. . . .”).  
192. 22 C.F.R. § 127.12(b)(2); 15 C.F.R. § 764.5(b)(3). 
193. See Jonathan C. Poling & Stephen Martin, Corporate and Individual Liability After VSDs and 
Gormley Case, in THE EXPORT PRACTITIONER 3 (May 2014) (“VSDs may provide no protection to 
individual employees, who may have separate and independent civil and criminal liability. The 
Gormley case is an example where an employee was not only criminally charged after a VSD was 
filed, but the VSD clearly assisted law enforcement in developing the criminal charges against 
him.”). But see George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 288–89 (1968) (“It has long 
been settled . . . that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination . . . cannot be utilized by 
or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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exporter who has made a voluntary disclosure is less able to negotiate a settlement 
figure in return for admissions of guilt, as guilt has already been established by the 
disclosure.194 
Voluntary disclosures are the source of the largest percentage of export violations 
investigated by DDTC, with the remainder originating from violations discovered by 
the DDTC export licensing division, by whistleblowers, as a consequence of a related 
violation of other companies, or developed by outside enforcement investigations.195  
By comparison, voluntary self-disclosures (“VSDs”)196 to BIS were the source of less 
than ten percent of the enforcement matters investigated in 2014, with most matters 
originating from investigations by OEE agents or other law enforcement agencies.197  
In 2014, DDTC received 1,134 VSDs,198 while BIS received approximately 225 
VSDs.199   
A. Department of State, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls 
 Compliance200 
The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls enforces ITAR violations through its 
Office of Trade Controls Compliance (OTCC)201 and within this office, the 
Compliance, Registration, and Enforcement Division.202  The enforcement staff at 
DDTC contains approximately seventy employees, of which about thirty-five or half 
are non-civil service compliance specialists employed by a government contractor.203  
Assignments for the contractor employees are described by the contractor as:  
 
194. See also Liebman, Thomsen & Bartlett, supra note 6, at § 5.05[2][a]. 
195. Interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 71. 
196. 15 C.F.R. § 764.5(b)(4).  The ITAR uses the term “voluntary disclosure,” 22 C.F.R. § 127.12, but the 
same action is inexplicably described by the EAR as a “voluntary self-disclosure,” 15 C.F.R. § 
764.5(b)(4). The Commerce Department Foreign Trade Regulations also use the term “voluntary 
self-disclosure,” id. § 30.74.  The word “self” is unnecessary in this context, because a disclosure 
submitted by someone other than the person who committed the violation would not qualify as 
voluntary.   
197. Interview with Douglas R. Hassebrock, supra note 159. 
198. Interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 71.  Number of yearly voluntary disclosures submitted to 
DDTC that were treated as civil matters (no proof of willfulness) were as follows:  FY2007: 759; 
FY2008: 1,000; FY2009: 1,036; FY2010: 1,260: FY2011: 1,224; FY2012: 1,371; FY2013: 1,936 (of 
which 288 were submitted by United Technologies Corp.); FY2014: 1,134.  Number of yearly 
directed disclosures were as follows:  FY2007: 47; FY2008: 107; FY2009: 117; FY2010: 58; FY2011: 
88; FY2012: 111; FY2013: 79; FY2014: 59.  Id. 
199. Interview with Douglas R. Hassebrock, supra note 159. 
200. Substantive facts in this section are, unless otherwise indicated, generally attributed to the 
interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 71. 
201. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(b)(2)(ii) (2014). 
202. See Key Personnel, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS (Oct. 29, 
2015) http://1.usa.gov/1tp5XIW. 
203. One contractor supplying contract employees to DTCC is Henderson Group Unlimited, Inc., of 
Alexandria, VA, advertising that they “provide[] administrative support services to Federal, State, 
and Local Government Agencies.”  Job posting by Henderson Group Unlimited, Inc., for “Defense 
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Take initial action on all incoming voluntary disclosures from the 
defense industry on civil violations of the AECA and ITAR. For 
disclosures of a minor violation, create a computer record and draft 
a response for the chief’s signature. For incomplete disclosures, 
draft a letter with response deadline for the chief’s signature, 
maintain a tracking system and insure receipt of full disclosure 
information. For all other violations, create a computer record and 
assign to appropriate employee. 
Review and take action on voluntary disclosures assigned by the 
division chief, initially working minor violations. Follow office 
policies and procedures and guidance received from the division 
chief or senior specialist. Plan an approach, conduct fact-finding, 
perform search of records, attend meetings and then document 
findings. Initiate discovery of additional facts. Consult with 
supervisor and take action. Prepare letter for division chief 
signature responding to the violation, including requirements for 
corrective action to close each case. Perform any follow-up as 
directed by division chief. . . .204 
A question may be asked as to whether these duties, when performed by non-civil 
service employees, might be subject to U.S. law prohibiting contractors from 
performing “inherently governmental functions,”205 but at DTCC, the contractors 
are supervised by DTCC civil service managers, have no authority to make final 
decisions regarding compliance matters, and the DTCC director must approve the 
recommendations of the contractor employees.  Whether or not the practice is 
allowed by law, and even though all contract employees sign non-disclosure 
agreements, companies that disclose suspected violations and compliance 
weaknesses to DDTC may ask whether it is appropriate for an employee of a private 
company to participate in the review of sensitive and proprietary information of 
another private company. 
Voluntary disclosures to DDTC are initially reviewed by a “Triage Team” 
consisting of three civil service DTCC employees and two contractor employees.206  
For each new VD, the team recommends one of three actions: (1) refer to HSI or FBI 
serious matters that indicate willful actions that may affect national security, such 
 
Trade Control Compliance Analyst”.  Advertisement for Defense Trade Control Compliance Analyst 
Position, Henderson Group Unlimited Inc., http://bit.ly/1CTHpL9 (last visited Nov. 10, 2015).   
204. Id. 
205. See Work Reserved for Performance by Federal Government Employees, 75 Fed. Reg. 16,188, 
16,194 (Mar. 31, 2010) (advising that a government contractor’s work “would be inappropriate 
where the contractor’s involvement is or would be so extensive, or the contractor’s work product so 
close to a final agency product, as to effectively preempt the federal officials’ decision-making 
process, discretion or authority”).   
206. Unlike OEE, DTCC does not have field offices.  All disclosures are reviewed in their Washington 
D.C. headquarters.  Interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 71.   
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as unauthorized end use, diversions, and retransfers, and substantial involvement 
with denied parties or prohibited countries,207 and often  result in criminal charges 
and plea agreements;208 (2) assign to experienced DTCC compliance reviewers the 
intermediate matters that indicate systemic compliance issues, repeated violations, 
or other indications that a Consent Agreement may be justified; and (3) close out 
minor matters that indicate the disclosing party has adequately explained the 
incident, and has taken appropriate corrective actions.209  An average of sixty to 
seventy percent of VDs are resolved in the latter category.210  Unless VDs result in 
criminal charges or Consent Agreements, disclosures and agency responses are not 
in the public record and not subject to release under Freedom of Information Act 
requests.211 
DDTC penalizes companies whose conduct shows systemic violations or 
widespread disregard for regulations.212  Where the case appears to involve 
 
207. Director Gainor stated, “DDTC does not look for countries most likely to be proliferating or 
retransferring defense articles to target.  We rely on HSI and other law enforcement agencies for 
that, because that is their job.  They handle the criminal investigations, we handle the civil 
compliance.  The State Department conducts ‘Blue Lantern’ end-use checks using U.S. embassy 
and consulate staff members, but those are not law enforcement investigations – those end-use 
checks are compliance verification.  If the Blue Lantern checks find that exported items are missing, 
we refer the information to law enforcement agencies to make an independent decision regarding 
whether to open and investigation.”  Id. 
208. E.g., Plea Agreement, United States v. United Technologies Corporation, Hamilton Sundstrand 
Corporation and Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (June 28, 2012), http://1.usa.gov/1yaR9MI. See, 
e.g., Consent Agreement, BAE Sys. PLC, supra note 191; U.S. Fines BAE $79 Million Over Arms-
Control Breaches, REUTERS, May 17, 2010, http://reut.rs/1w9Mmad (There were 2,591 violations of 
the AECA and ITAR involved. The company also pleaded guilty to one charge of conspiring to make 
false statements to the U.S. government and paid a fine of $400 million.); Consent Agreement, Xe 
Servs. LLC, supra note 191; Consent Agreement, ITT Corp., supra note 191.  See also supra note 
74 and accompanying text. 
209. Interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 71.  The number of yearly Consent Agreements concluded 
by DDTC, and any associated civil penalties assessed, were as follows:  FY2007: 0; FY2008: 4, with 
$47M in civil penalties assessed; FY2009: 2, with $600,000 in civil penalties assessed; FY2010: 3, 
with $43M in civil penalties assessed; FY2011: 1, with $79M in civil penalties assessed; FY2012: 3, 
with $55M in civil penalties assessed; FY2013: 3, with $41M in civil penalties assessed; and 
FY2014: 2, with $30M in civil penalties assessed.  Id.  If a Consent Agreement is not concluded and 
DDTC proceeds with prosecution, it has the ability to issue pre-trial certifications of classification 
of the items alleged to have been used or transferred in violation of export control laws that 
significantly limit the ability of a defendant to challenge the agency’s classification.  The yearly 
number of pre-trial certifications issued by DDTC were as follows:  FY2007: 88; FY2008: 117; 
FY2009: 121; FY2010: 156; FY2011: 197; FY2012: 230; FY2013: 162; and FY2014: 239.  Id.  
210. Interview with Daniel J. Buzby, Senior Compliance Advisor, Office of Defense Trade Controls 
Compliance, Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. State Dep’t (Jan 9, 2015). 
211. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2015) (FOIA provision exempting from disclosure commercial or financial 
information received from a person that is confidential); 22 C.F.R. § 171.13 (2015) (corresponding 
Department of State regulation regarding FOIA business information exemption). 
212. Id.  See generally FRIED FRANK, ITAR ENFORCEMENT DIGEST 3 (July 2012) (“[C]ases settled in 
recent years have reflected a trend for DDTC to penalize companies that it perceives have flouted 
DDTC’s authority, questioned its judgment, or deceived the agency in some manner.”). 
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intentional violations, DDTC may refer cases for investigation by HSI or FBI.  This 
occurred in United States v. Pratt Whitney Canada Corp., where voluntary 
disclosures submitted to DDTC were reviewed by HSI agents who then originated a 
criminal investigation.213  DDTC may prepare a proposed charging letter alleging 
AECA and ITAR violations,214 and offer the disclosing company the choice of 
entering a Consent Agreement in which the respondent will stipulate to the facts of 
the violations (although not necessarily the element of willfulness), and agree to 
settle the matter by paying a fine and taking specific corrective actions, such as 
hiring and training adequate staff, installing new information technology systems, 
and requiring oversight by the company’s law department.215  The corrective actions 
often permit a company to spend all or a portion of the amount of its fine on 
corrective measures in lieu of payment to the government.216 
DDTC has a reputation with the exporter community of being more attentive to 
company compliance deficiencies than OEE’s reputation of taking a primary interest 
in discovering and punishing violations.  With an obvious comparison to OEE 
practices, Kenneth B. Handelman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Office 
of Defense Trade Controls in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, stated the 
following about DDTC’s philosophy regarding enforcement: 
We don’t have people with guns and badges, and even if we did have 
them, we wouldn’t have enough of them.  We rely on HSI and FBI.  
If something goes wrong, you all can come in and tell us about it. 
We’ll determine if it is a one-time or systemic violation.  Our people 
are not rewarded by the number of violations they find or the 
penalties imposed. 217   
 
213. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Consent Agreement, United Technologies 
Corp. (June 19, 2012), available at 
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent_agreements/pdf/UTC_CA.pdf. 
214. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Trade Controls Compliance, Proposed Charging Letter, Intersil 
Corporation (July 18, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1tZlAl4; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, Proposed Charging Letter, Esterline Tech. Corp. (Mar. 5, 2014), 
http://1.usa.gov/14Pl6HJ; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Proposed 
Charging Letter, Meggitt-USA, Inc. (Aug. 23, 2013),  
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/compliance/consent_agreements/pdf/Meggitt_PCL.pdf.  
215. 22 C.F.R. § 128.11 (2006). 
216. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Trade Controls Compliance, Consent Agreement, Intersil 
Corp. (July 18, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1A7M1qI (of the $10 million fine, $4 million was eligible for 
corrective actions); U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Trade Controls Compliance, Consent Agreement, 
Esterline Tech. Corp. (Mar. 5, 2014), http://1.usa.gov/1xgJicr (of the $20 million fine, $10 million 
was eligible for corrective actions); U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of Trade Controls Compliance, Consent 
Agreement, Meggitt-USA, Inc. (Aug. 23, 2013), http://1.usa.gov/1BTTtdp (of the $25 million fine, 
$22 million was eligible for corrective actions).  
217. Kenneth B. Handelman, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Office of Defense Trade 
Controls, Speech at BIS Annual Update Conference (July 30, 2014). 
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This description was expanded by Sue Gainor, Director, Office of Defense Trade 
Controls Compliance, who stated: 
We don’t assume or even suspect willfulness at the outset of 
reviewing a VD.  We know that honest mistakes are a part of doing 
business.  Fines and other penalties discourage voluntary 
disclosures.  We have a partnership with industry that is important.  
The VD and the corrective actions guided by DDTC are important 
to the improvement of industry compliance.  The disclosing company 
becomes a better company because we have educated them and 
helped them see how they made mistakes, and showed how to avoid 
mistakes in the future.218 
B. Department of Commerce, Office of Export Enforcement219 
Voluntary self-disclosures of EAR violations submitted to BIS are initially 
reviewed by OEE’s director in Washington, D.C., but unlike the DTCC method of 
handling all VDs at headquarters, VSDs are assigned to the Special Agent-in-
Charge of the OEE field office nearest where the disclosing company is located.220  
When responsible OEE agents receive VSDs, they have the authority, with approval 
of the OEE Special Agent-in-Charge, to close the matter, or to initiate further 
investigative steps.  If a VSD results in a recommendation for enforcement action, 
an agent may refer the matter to the Justice Department and/or recommend to the 
OEE director that a charging letter be issued to the suspected violator, termed a 
Respondent.221  Recommendations for potential charging letters are reviewed by the 
BIS Induction Committee, an internal BIS committee currently chaired by the 
Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement.  Referrals of VSDs to DOJ for criminal 
prosecution are rare.  One case in 2013 involved criminal charges against the 
compliance official of a company that submitted a VSD, but the company avoided 
criminal action and the financial penalty was suspended in its entirety.222  Another 
criminal case that involved a VSD was given judicial scrutiny as to whether it met 
the requirements of a VSD, whether individuals should have been prosecuted, and 
 
218. Interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 71. 
219. Substantive facts in this section are, unless otherwise indicated, attributed to the interview with 
Douglas Hassebrock, supra note 159. 
220. OEE has eight field offices in the United States.  Id.  DDTC has no field offices.  Interview with Sue 
Gainor, supra note 71. While DDTC and BIS have differing processes for the review of voluntary 
disclosures/voluntary self-disclosure, there is no legislative impediment to the agencies 
collaborating to develop and implement several enhances to making more consistent the review of 
disclosures and the outcome more predictable to industry. For example, DDTC and BIS could 
develop and publish a common policy and procedures for reviewing disclosures and for developing 
when compliance or enforcement actions should be initiated.   
221. 15 C.F.R. § 764.5(d) (2013). 
222. United States v. Gormley, No. 2:12-cr-00423-GP (E.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2013).  
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whether the terms of the deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) were 
appropriate.223  The Court rejected the settlement, calling it “grossly 
disproportionate to the gravity of Fokker Services’ conduct in a post-9/11 world.”224  
All proposed settlements are submitted by the Director of OEE and must be 
approved by the Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement. OEE often requires 
outside audits as a way to bring companies into compliance, as it results in a 
quantifiable and tangible benefit to the Government in terms of results, but does not 
use the DDTC type of consent agreements where respondents agree to pay a fine, 
but are then permitted to use a portion of that fine for internal corrective actions.225 
Industries historically regulated under the ITAR have expressed concern 
regarding different approaches taken by BIS and DDTC at State, particularly with 
regard to the disposition of VSDs.  During the past few years at BIS, only a very 
small percentage of VSDs have resulted in administrative penalties, generally 
varying from 3 to 6 percent.226  Assistant Secretary David W. Mills made the 
following statement regarding the generally accepted difference between how the 
BIS and DDTC handle disclosures:  
 
223. See United States v. Fokker Services B.V., No. 1:14-cr-00121-RJL (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2014). 
224. Id. at 12. Although DOJ accepted that the company’s disclosure was voluntary, it proceeded with 
prosecution, and proposed settlement by DPA.  See Sam Gilston, Justice Won’t Prosecute Firms that 
File Complete Voluntary Self-Disclosures, THE EXPORT PRACTITIONER 25 (May 2012) (“It is the 
Justice Department’s long-standing policy not to undertake the criminal prosecution of companies 
that make ‘truthful, complete, self-initiated voluntary disclosures,’ said [National Export 
Coordinator] Steve Pelak.”).  There is disagreement as to whether a disclosure meets this criteria 
and whether the disclosure itself covers individual liability of employees. See Andrew Zajac & Greg 
Farrell, Fokker Sanctions Deal Clouded by Agent on Iran Confession, BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2014, 
12:31 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-24/fokker-sanctions-case-delayed-on-
new-probe-information (discussing federal court’s deliberation of the proposed DPA and 
consideration of whether the disclosure was truthful, complete, and self-initiated, and whether the 
conduct disclosed was known to the government before the disclosure was filed).  The Court 
accepted that Fokker voluntarily disclosed the violations, but rejected the settlement and its terms 
as being too lenient, suggesting the need for prosecutions of individuals, an independent monitor, 
and more significant fines, given the revenue generated from the over 1,000 illegal 
transactions.  Fokker, No. 1:14-cr-00121-RJL, at 12 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 2015) (“Finally, the DPA does 
not call for an independent monitor, or for any periodic reports to be made to either this Court or 
the Government verifying the company’s compliance with U.S. law over this very brief 18-month 
period. As such, the court is being left to rely solely on the self-reporting of Fokker Services.  One 
can only imagine how a company with such a long track record of deceit and illegal behavior 
convinced the Department of Justice to agree to that!”) (citation omitted). 
225. E-mail from Douglas R. Hassebrock, Director, Office of Export Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of 
Commerce to James E. Bartlett III (Jan. 12, 2015) (on file with author) (“It seems inaccurate to call 
something a ‘fine’ and then allow the penalized party to use it to pay somebody else.  The ‘fine’ 
should be paid to the Government as punitive action for the violation.  The Government should 
expect you to have compliance program to avoid further penalties.  In our cases, we include the cost 
of the Audit in our internal deliberations and settlement discussions as part of the overall penalty.”). 
226. David W. Mills, Assistant Sec’y for Export Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Remarks at BIS 
Annual Update Conference on Export Controls and Policy (July 24, 2013), available at 
http://1.usa.gov/1xuz0fI.   
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I recognize there has been some angst in the export community 
about the compliance philosophies of BIS versus DTC with regard 
to military items. . . .  [I]t is my sense that we will handle the 600 
Series VSDs in a manner very similar to that of DDTC and that 
most will result in a warning letter or no action at all, as is the case 
with most VSDs previously filed under the EAR. What this issue 
primarily speaks to is how the two agencies handle cases under the 
doctrine of strict liability, which I believe to be substantially the 
same.227  
Assistant Secretary Mills also offered the following reassurance to possibly 
concerned exporters at the 2013 Annual Update Conference: “Our objective is not to 
exercise our authority to hold parties strictly liable for every inadvertent and 
insignificant violation of the EAR that might take place.  Absent evidence of systemic 
problems recurring over a period of time, inadvertent and insignificant violations 
will generally be resolved through warning letters.”228  One trade group opined that 
although the exporters viewed voluntary disclosures as the duty of a good corporate 
citizen, OEE views a VSD as the initial phase of a criminal investigation.229  When 
OEE receives a VSD, its law enforcement officers, who are trained to look for possible 
criminal violations, may be more focused on finding a criminal charge or systemic 
series of violations than just dealing with the disclosed minor violation, and 
addressing and remediating routine compliance deficiencies, as usually is the case 
with DDTC.”230   
IV. ECR Plan to Merge OEE into Department of Homeland 
Security  
In conducting interviews for this article with current and former law enforcement 
officials with several agencies, the authors found considerable disagreement over 
which agency, if any, is best positioned to handle export control investigations.  
Those supporting a robust enforcement agency within the Department of Commerce 
 
227. David W. Mills, Assistant Sec’y for Export Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Keynote Speech 
at BIS Annual Update Conference on Export Controls and Policy (July 30, 2014), available at 
http://1.usa.gov/1NKNeQ0. 
228. Mills, supra note 226, at 18. 
229. See Defense Trade Advisory Group, Export Control Reform – Unintended Consequences 6, 
http://1.usa.gov/1BfDgNE. (“Voluntary Disclosures Under ECR—Industry views their 
responsibility as a good corporate citizen to proactively disclose violation infractions, where[as] OEE 
enforcement views VSD as the initial phase of an investigation.”). 
230. E-mail from Douglas R. Hassebrock, supra note 225. Several export compliance officers who did not 
wish to be identified commented about how OEE special agents interviewed employees as compared 
to DTCC compliance officers.  OEE investigators sometimes “acted like stereotypical cops 
interrogating a suspect, flashing their badges and subtly displaying their guns, while the DDTC 
compliance specialists seemed genuinely concerned with correcting compliance problems, not out to 
play ‘gotcha’ with employees.” 
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maintain that OEE agents are a small, well-trained, and experienced group of 
criminal investigators with specialized expertise in Commerce Department 
regulations, and are able to best leverage the efficiency of TDOs and Entity List 
designations. Those arguing for legislation to implement OEE’s merger into HSI 
highlight the border authority of HSI, its overseas presence, and its legacy 
relationship with CBP. 
Despite the criticism of the disadvantages of overlapping jurisdiction and 
dispersed authorities on export control enforcement, many major export 
enforcement cases were successfully investigated by multiple agencies,231 and 
several federal prosecutors interviewed by the authors of this article expressed 
concerns that moving to a single criminal enforcement agency with exclusive 
jurisdiction would reduce the beneficial effects of competition between the agencies, 
which often results in arrests that would otherwise not have been made.232  
While some support legislation to transition OEE agents to HSI units under the 
control of the Department of Homeland Security, other current and former 
government officials, including a former OEE official, noted that BIS did not favor 
that plan, stating that one of the most important attributes of BIS agents is that 
they are dedicated solely to export control enforcement—in comparison to HSI 
agents, who may be reassigned to other DHS priorities, like immigration or child 
pornography.233  The White House agreed with the plan to merge these agencies,234 
but has issued no directions on how a consolidation of enforcement agencies would 
be accomplished.  This has bolstered some criticism that ECR may be undermining 
national security.235  
 
231. See, e.g., Gregory W. Bowman, A Prescription for Curing U.S. Export Controls, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 
599, 620 (2013) (citing only one report to Congress by one enforcement agency and determining that 
although civil and criminal penalties are possible for violations of U.S. export control laws and 
regulations, investigations, they are “rare”).  But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
PROPOSED REFORMS CREATE OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 12, at 24 (finding an increase in 
enforcement cases, and detailing that between 2006–2010,  ICE had obtained 1,498 arrests, 1,177 
indictments, and 859 convictions for defense and dual use items cases and OEE had obtained 116 
arrests, 222 indictments, and 156 convictions for dual use cases).   
232. Several federal prosecutors who did not wish to be identified stated that each enforcement agency 
has unique skills and strengths that could often be leveraged in an investigation and “when they 
like each other and work with each other,” it can be a very strong deterrent against those seeking 
to obtain products or technology illegally from the United States.  One senior prosecutor stated, “If 
HSI does not want to look at some records, I will just ask the FBI, and a little healthy competition 
among enforcement agencies has never hurt anyone.” 
233. Interview with Mark Menefee, former Director, Bureau of Industry & Security Office of Export 
Enforcement (Jan. 26, 2015).  
234. See, e.g., Export Control Reform Initiative Fact Sheet #6, supra note 11; McDonough, supra note 
174. 
235. See, e.g., Brittany Benowitz & Barry Kellman, Rethink Plans to Loosen U.S. Controls on Arms 
Exports, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (Apr. 2013), http://bit.ly/1tHzX2I (“Does the Commerce 
Department have the requisite expertise and statutory authority to ensure effective detection and 
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The movement of items from the USML to the CCL and the differing approaches 
to export control enforcement by the Departments of State and Commerce 
demonstrate part of the basis for this criticism:  Defense articles, around which 
“higher fences” should exist because they remain on the USML, are administered by 
a licensing agency without internal law enforcement investigators, and with an 
approach historically focused on compliance rather than enforcement.  Meanwhile, 
the items moved from the USML to the CCL because they are less sensitive are 
administered by BIS—an agency with its own group of specialized export law 
enforcement agents.  OEE’s stricter enforcement methods may have an unintended 
chilling effect on disclosures.  A company that may have misplaced some 
“toothbrushes,” but knows that if they submit a VSD to OEE they will be treated 
like diamond thieves, will be less likely to report it.  The type of compliance 
assistance that DDTC gives after reviewing VDs, sometimes compelled by Consent 
Agreements, which helps companies guard their diamonds as well as their 
toothbrushes, will no longer be available for companies dealing in items that move 
from the USML to the CCL, and become subject to the enforcement practices of OEE.   
DDTC has no interest at this point in adding enforcement officers or agents to its 
staff, and is comfortable handling violations using its internal compliance 
specialists, and relying on FBI and HSI for criminal investigations.236  Although 
OEE has the advantage of internal special agents whose only responsibility is to 
enforce the EAR, OEE lacks the statutory authority exercised by HSI and FBI in the 
following areas:  (1) greater and permanent overseas investigative authority since 
BIS must conduct overseas investigations through an arrangement with DHS;237 (2) 
 
prosecution of violators?”); WILLIAM D. HARTUNG, CTR. FOR INT’L POL’Y, RISK AND RETURNS: THE 
ECONOMIC ILLOGIC OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S ARMS EXPORT REFORMS 4 (Aug. 2013), 
http://bit.ly/1xfveVz;  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REFORM’S IMPACT ON COMPLIANCE 
ACTIVITIES, supra note 114, at 25; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-354, EXPORT 
CONTROLS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED TECHNOLOGY RELEASES TO 
FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES 37 (Feb. 2011). 
236. Interview with Sue Gainor, supra note 71. 
237. See also Addressing Potential Threats from Iran: Administration Perspectives on Implementing New 
Economic Sanctions One Year Later: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban 
Affairs, 112th Cong. 71 (2011) (response to Chairman Sen. Tim Johnson’s written questions by 
David W. Mills, Assistant Sec’y for Export Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce) [hereinafter Mills, 
Addressing Potential Threats] (“Having permanent, independent overseas investigative authority 
would reduce the bureaucratic steps OEE currently has to take, thereby streamlining the 
investigative process.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUS. AND SEC., FISCAL 
YEAR 2015 PRESIDENT’S SUBMISSION: BUDGET ESTIMATE BIS-50 (2014), http://1.usa.gov/14eUAqX 
(requesting additional funds for increase in Export Control Officers stationed abroad to enhance 
ability to inspect potentially unlawful exports); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUDGET IN BRIEF: FISCAL 
YEAR 2014 65–66 (2013), http://1.usa.gov/14eV4gY (“Failing to fund the enforcement aspect of ECR 
will leave this Presidential Initiative incomplete and could undermine the current effectiveness of 
BIS’s Export Enforcement efforts. . . .  These new resources will expand current Export Control 
Officer (ECO) operations, enhance current Intelligence efforts, and expand the Bureau’s national 
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expanded undercover investigative authority that would allow BIS to participate in 
the full scope of undercover activities, including setting up front companies and 
receiving payments;238 (3) forfeiture authority, which would allow BIS to participate 
in the Treasury Forfeiture Fund;239 and finally, (4) wiretapping authority, which 
would give BIS the ability to participate in obtaining wire taps.240  
Opponents of the proposed merger of OEE into HSI brought to the authors’ 
attention the unsuccessful attempts during the 1980s and 1990s to merge two other 
 
enforcement and analytical capabilities.”); Advancing Export Control Reform: The Agenda Ahead: 
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113th Cong. 8 (2013) (statement of Kevin J. Wolf, Assistant 
Sec’y of Commerce, BIS), available at http://1.usa.gov/17ekNIf (“Commerce has made clear that 
additional resources would increase operational efficiencies and activities. The President’s Fiscal 
Year 2014 budget requests $8.291 million for additional resources to augment BIS enforcement 
capabilities. These include additional analysts, Special Agents, and three new Export Control 
Officers, two of which would be dedicated to conducting end-use checks in STA-eligible countries, 
with the third expanding our regional footprint in the Middle East.”). 
238. Mills, Addressing Potential Threats, supra note 237, at 71–72 (“BIS is currently dependent on the 
participation and support of other law enforcement agencies in undercover operations and is thus 
limited by the priorities, resources and availability of those agencies. Providing BIS with 
independent undercover investigative authority would remove this impediment.”); A Strategic and 
Economic Review of Aerospace Exports: Hearing Before the Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Matthew S. 
Borman, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Export Admin., BIS, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce); id. (statement 
of Kevin J. Wolf, Assistant Sec’y of Commerce, BIS), http://1.usa.gov/17ekNIf (“Commerce has made 
clear that additional resources would increase operational efficiencies and activities. The 
President’s Fiscal Year 2014 budget requests $8.291 million for additional resources to augment 
BIS enforcement capabilities. These include additional analysts, Special Agents, and three new 
Export Control Officers, two of which would be dedicated to conducting end-use checks in STA-
eligible countries, with the third expanding our regional footprint in the Middle East.”); see also 
Export Enforcement Act of 2007, S. 2000, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) (proposed legislation providing 
BIS with authority to conduct undercover operations). 
239. Mills, Addressing Potential Threats, supra note 237, at 72 (“The independent authority to obtain 
forfeiture of the fruits and proceeds of export violations and to participate in the Treasury Forfeiture 
Fund would provide BIS with the practical ability to attack the underlying economic motives for 
export violations, and deprive violators of the profits of their illegal activities.”); U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS: THE EXPORT ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2007 3, 
http://2010-
2014.commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2014/january/eaa_sectional_041307.pdf (noting 
that proposed amended to EEA would “make clear that BIS is a member of [the U.S. Treasury 
Forfeiture Fund]” as doing so requires statutory authority); see also Export Enforcement Act of 
2007, S. 2000, 110th Cong. §§ 3, 4, 9 (2007) (proposed legislation providing BIS for mandatory 
forfeiture and participation in U.S. Treasury Forfeiture Fund). 
240. Mills, Addressing Potential Threats, supra note 237, at 72 (“Wiretap authority would give OEE 
access to the inner workings of export control conspiracies as they are occurring, thereby providing 
invaluable evidence for a prosecutor seeking to prove the elements of a conspiracy, including 
evidence to present to a jury about the intent of the parties.”); SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS: THE 
EXPORT ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2007, supra note 239, at 2 (“Undercover and wiretap authorities are 
essential to the effective enforcement of export controls and related laws, and greatly enhance the 
ability of the Departments of Commerce and Homeland Security, in addition to other federal 
agencies authorized to enforce the Act, to effectively and efficiently investigate export control 
violations.”); see also Export Enforcement Act of 2007, S. 2000, 110th Cong. § 9 (2007) (proposed 
legislation providing BIS with authority to obtain wiretaps). 
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federal law enforcement agencies, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and suggested that the proposed OEE/HSI merger 
is analogous.  The DEA/FBI merger was initially proposed, then dropped, by the 
Reagan Administration in both 1982241 and in 1985,242 and the Clinton 
Administration in 1993,243 as part of Vice President Al Gore’s efforts to reduce 
government costs by combining agencies with redundant missions.  In 1993, Senate 
debate over the proposed merger of DEA into FBI contained arguments for and 
against merger of the agencies that are similar to today’s discussions of the proposed 
merger of OEE into HSI.244   
The arguments favoring the DEA/FBI merger were that the merger would (1) 
reduce the cost of administration of two separate law enforcement agencies; (2) allow 
the redundant administrative officers to be assigned to street investigations; (3) 
provide the Director of the FBI with the flexibility to shift the combined agency 
officers from one area of investigation or enforcement such as bank robbery or 
organized crime to another area, depending on FBI needs, rather than having all 
DEA agents restricted to drug law enforcement; and (4) would resolve jurisdictional 
disputes regarding which agency had the lead in investigating certain matters.245  
Opponents of the merger argued it would (1) wipe out the only Federal law 
enforcement agency focused exclusively to fighting drugs, reducing that specialized 
agency to one of ten or so divisions of the FBI, and the former DEA entity would then 
have to compete for funds, personnel, and resources with other FBI programs; (2) 
erase DEA’s distinct drug investigative techniques and operating culture, built over 
 
241. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-59, JUSTICE DEP’T—COORDINATION 
BETWEEN DEA AND FBI (1990) (An order by the Attorney General in 1982 directing coordination 
between the two agencies requiring the Administrator, DEA, to report through the Director, FBI, 
to the Attorney General was never followed, and was rescinded by the Attorney General.); DRUG 
ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., 1980-1985 43, 46 http://www.dea.gov/about/history/1980-1985.pdf. 
242. Washington Post, Meese Moves To Merge FBI, Drug Agency, ORLANDO SENTINEL (May 26, 1985), 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1985-05-26/news/0300210230_1_dea-agents-fbi-academy-
dea-administrator. 
243. See A DEA-FBI-BATF Merger?, INTELLIGENCE ONLINE (Sept. 13, 1993), 
http://www.intelligenceonline.com/community-watch/1993/09/15/a-dea-fbi-batf-merger,64179-
ART.  See generally Neil A. Lewis, White House Seeks to Combine F.B.I. with Drug Agency, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 19, 1993, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/19/us/white-house-seeks-to-combine-fbi-
with-drug-agency.html. (“In a move that has touched off a ferocious debate within the Government, 
the Clinton Administration is proposing to consolidate the fight against drugs by merging the Drug 
Enforcement Administration into the Federal Bureau of Investigation, officials said today.  The idea 
has drug agency officials preparing to wage war to preserve or enhance their status, and scurrying 
to find allies in Congress, where significant opposition has already surfaced. . . .  The drug agency, 
in papers distributed throughout the Government, has warned that the effort to fight illegal drugs 
would be irreparably crippled if its agents were forced under the command of the bureau.”). 
244. FBI and DEA: Merger or Enhanced Cooperation?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. of the Judiciary, 
103rd Cong. (1993) [hereinafter Merger Hearing]. 
245. Merger Hearing, supra note 244, at 9 (statement by Sen. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.). 
14 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2015) 
44 
years of experience; (3) result in a loss of trust of foreign governments with whom 
DEA had developed close relationships; (4) result in the need to splice the drug 
agency into yet another agency in a few years given that DEA’s important regulatory 
enforcement responsibility depends on DEA agents’ specialized knowledge of the 
drug laws, an area that FBI would not easily take on; and (5) send the silent but 
powerful message that the government does not care as much about fighting 
drugs.246 
Regarding the assumed benefit of reducing rivalry between DEA and the FBI, 
Senator Charles Schumer stated, “Some rivalry is healthy, as well as inevitable.  It 
is healthy within the proper bounds because it inspires competition.  As long as it is 
properly managed, competition between these two agencies may get better results—
more cases, more investigations, and more convictions.”247  Senator Schumer 
concluded his objection to the merger by stating, “In sum, I fear that this well-
intentioned effort to cut costs and duplication would cost more than we would save.  
It would mean less efficiency on the street, where it counts, and fewer traffickers 
behind bars.”248 
Rep. William J. Hughes, former Chair of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 
opposed the merger on several grounds, but chiefly because he believed that the 
expertise of DEA agents, both in the regulations they enforced and their familiarity 
with the persons in the drug community would be lost if DEA agents were merged 
into the wide ranging jurisdiction of the FBI.249   Congressman Hughes was also 
concerned with the disruptive effect it would have on the two organizations, 
especially for the DEA agents.  While proponents described it as a “merger” or 
“consolidation,” Hughes stated “the fact is, it is a hostile takeover.”250   
Although there are similarities between the proposed DEA/FBI and OEE/HSI 
mergers, the analogy is weakened by the facts that DEA is a much larger agency 
than BIS, that FBI lacked the substantial contacts with foreign governments that 
DEA had, and that both DEA and FBI were already under the management of the 
U.S. Attorney General in the Department of Justice.  Congress has not yet debated 
the proposed merger of OEE into HSI, but the similarities with the unsuccessful 
proposals to merge DEA with FBI may provide congressional opponents with 
arguments leading to a similar outcome.   
 
246. Id. 
247. Merger Hearing, supra note 244, at 10 (statement by Sen. Charles E. Schumer). 
248. Id. 
249. Merger Hearing, supra note 244, at 11 (statement by Rep. William J. Hughes). 
250. Id. 
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
OEE is currently an efficient and effective (although arguably underfunded) law 
enforcement agency, consisting of over 100 special agents and compliance specialists 
in Washington, D.C., and nationwide field offices, whose sole mission is to enforce 
the EAR.  The Administration’s latest ECR plan would remove OEE agents from 
BIS to combine them with other investigative agencies controlled by the Department 
of Homeland Security.  Each agency’s compliance system has its pros and cons, with 
BIS having the advantage of internally assigned and certified law enforcement 
investigators, and with DDTC having the advantage of compliance specialists with 
business experience who are more concerned and familiar with the day-to-day 
business of defense industry manufacturers and exporters than are OEE agents. 
If a single licensing agency is eventually created as planned by ECR, it should 
employ dedicated law enforcement officers like OEE agents, reporting to the head of 
the licensing agency, coordinated with other federal law enforcement agencies by 
E2C2, with independent authority to conduct domestic and overseas undercover 
criminal investigations and to apply for search warrants and wiretap authorization.  
The single licensing agency should also include a DDTC-style “Triage Team” process 
of reviewing voluntary disclosures by compliance specialists, referring only the 
egregious matters to law enforcement officers for investigation.  Unless a single 
export licensing agency is created by Congress, both BIS and DDTC should maintain 
their current separate compliance review procedures.   
In the opinion of one of this article’s authors, DDTC has the better disclosure 
review and settlement process.  BIS could substantially improve its handling of 
VSDs without legislation by adding a DDTC-style administrative compliance staff 
to initially review all VSDs, by handling routine compliance matters at the 
headquarters level before referring the suspected criminal violations for 
investigation by OEE officers, and by negotiating consent agreements with 
corporations that would motivate them to spend money on improving their 
compliance programs, under OEE supervision, that would otherwise be paid as fines 
to the government.  
In the other author’s opinion, the current BIS method of VSD reviews by OEE 
officers is, on the whole, the better method, because it is not always clear whether 
someone has misplaced a toothbrush or unlawfully transferred diamonds.  Although 
many items are being transferred from the USML to the CCL to take advantage of 
a more relaxed BIS licensing policy, both agencies—DDTC and BIS—guard a 
combination of toothbrushes and diamonds.  Skilled investigators need early 
opportunities to recognize the egregious matters and follow facts to develop 
actionable evidence.  Both agencies must have the resources and authorities to test 
corporate representations made about the nature and extent of serious violations 
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that may be disguised to look benign in voluntary disclosures.251  While disclosures 
are something both DDTC and BIS wish to promote, concerns of heavy-handed 
treatment by BIS agents have not resulted in data that suggests fewer disclosures 
are filed or more enforcement actions arise from VSDs to OEE.   
We agree, however, that at this time, legislation should not be enacted to merge 
OEE into DHS, as that would result in a serious loss of enforcement expertise in a 
rapidly increasing segment of controlled exports.  Although a single list of controlled 
items, a single licensing agency, and a single IT system will improve the U.S. export 
control system, the current separate enforcement system works well, and the 
proposed combination of enforcement agencies would degrade enforcement.  There 
may be a better future solution once a single licensing agency is established, but for 
the present, we recommend that Congress follow the old adage, “if it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it.”  
 
 
251. See, e.g., Press Release, United Technologies Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges for 
Helping China Develop New Attack Helicopter, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 28, 2012) (announcing 
settlement and noting how the companies failed to disclose to the United States government illegal 
exports for several years and only after an investor group raised questions and when the disclosures 
were filed they contained “numerous false statements”).  
